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ABSTRACT 
The rise to power of Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chávez in the beginning of this 
century was accompanied by steady commodity price increases.  Both leaders benefited 
enormously from the increased profit produced, as the gross domestic product of both 
countries is closely tied to the energy market, and especially to oil.  The course of the 
recent relationship between Russia and Venezuela is marked by a steady increase in 
cooperation as these two countries grow increasingly close.  The relationship is touted by 
Russian and Venezuelan leaders as rejection of U.S. hegemony and establishment of a 
multipolar world through openness and international cooperation. 
Thus far, U.S. reaction has focused on non–confrontationally expressing the U.S. 
position on specific actions of each country, while paying little attention to potential 
strategic aims.  To date, the serious analysis has been centered on arms deals and other 
agreements resulting from the relationship instead of on the long–term goals of the 
parties involved.  As Russia and Venezuela use the relationship to reject U.S. influence, 
achieve strategic goals, and interact internationally with other countries, however, U.S. 
policy decisions and international relations would be better served to acquire a deeper 
understanding of, and appreciation for, the relationship and its future.   
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE RUSSIAN–VENEZUELAN 
RELATIONSHIP  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
A decade ago, when Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela, relations 
between that country and Russia were virtually non–existent.  However, over the course 
of the past ten years, this has changed remarkably.  In 2001, these two countries signed 
an initial agreement to collaborate on monitoring oil prices, which included a Russian 
pledge to sell Venezuela arms, and a Venezuelan promise to allow Russian energy 
companies access to the Venezuelan energy sector.1  Both countries have made good on 
their ends of the bargain.  Since 2005, Venezuela has purchased over four billion dollars 
worth of military hardware in several forms, and Russian companies have begun their 
work in Venezuela.2  This relationship has continued to expand, spilling over into many 
different areas.  In October 2008, plans were announced for a joint venture to build a 
nuclear reactor in the state of Zulia in order to increase Venezuelan capacity to provide 
energy for its citizenry.3   
The growth of the relationship caused alarm in many circles, particularly among 
those concerned with Chávez’s clear anti–U.S. ideology.4  Other analysts downplayed 
this fear, arguing instead that the relationship was a product of pragmatic policymakers 
                                                 
1  “Russian Firms Welcome Venezuela's Debut.” FSU Energy, 18 May 2001, 1. 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-31041504_ITM (accessed 11 November 2008). 
2  Sara Miller-Llana and Fred Weir, “Russia's New Presence in Latin America,” Christian Science 
Monitor (online), 24 November 2008, 1.  http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1125/p01s01-woam.html 
(accessed 5 December 2008).  See also:  “Venezuela Reaffirms Future Arms Purchases from Russia.” RIA 
Novosti (Russian News and Information Agency), 7 November 2008. 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20081107/118181084.html (accessed 11 December 2008). 
3  Russ Dallen, “Chavez Says Venezuela and Russia Will Build a Nuclear Reactor in Oil-Rich Zulia,” 
Latin American Herald Tribune (online), 3 December 2008, 1. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=10717&ArticleId=320618 (accessed 3 December 2008). 
4  Robert D. Peterson, “U.S. Strategy to Deal with Hugo Chavez's Establishment of Militias,” Master’s 
Thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 27 February 2008), 1-35.  See also:  Elisabeth 
Bumiller and Larry Rohter, “Bush, Replying to Chávez, Urges Latin Americans to Follow U.S.,” New 
York Times (online), 7 November 2005, 1-2.  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02E0DA143EF934A35752C1A9639C8B63&fta=y 
(accessed 16 December 2008). 
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pursuing their shared economic interests. 5  However, the emergence of a new, potentially 
strategic dimension in Venezuela’s relationship with Russia seems to challenge the 
suitability and completeness of the latter interpretation.  Strategic links have begun to 
take shape in the form of a recent joint Russian–Venezuelan naval exercise conducted in 
November 2008, with air exercises planned for 2009.6  Given the views of the leaders of 
both countries with respect to the United States, some are increasingly concerned about 
the quickly evolving relationship between these countries.7  
This thesis seeks to understand the reasons for this increased closeness between 
Russia and Venezuela.  More specifically, to what extent are the strategic interests of 
these two countries providing motivation for, and being served by, the growing 
relationship?  Is it a relationship based upon a strategic military and governmental 
alliance or is it better understood through the lens of oil and military–industrial 
economics?  What does each actor believe the relationship will produce for their side in 
the service and maintenance of these interests?  In conjunction with this, how might these 
perceptions differ, and what would be the resultant potential for miscalculation? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The overall aim of this thesis is to evaluate the importance of the Russian–
Venezuelan relationship and the possibility of it sponsoring a geo–strategic change in the 
international status quo.  The goal is not to provide policy prescriptions for the countries 
involved, but rather to provide a clear understanding of the motivation and interaction of 
 
                                                 
5  William Ratliff, “Pragmatism over Ideology: China’s Relations with Venezuela,” paper presented as 
China Brief for Jamestown Foundation 6, no. 6 (2006): 1-3.  See also:  Alex Sanchez, “Memorandum to the 
Press: Venezuela’s Security Factors and Foreign Policy Goals,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (online), 2 
May 2007.  http://www.coha.org/2007/05/memorandum-to-the-press-venezuelas-security-factors-and-
policy-goals/.  Also: Alex Sanchez, “Russia Returns to Latin America,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
(online), 14 February 2007.  http://www.coha.org/2007/02/russia-returns-to-latin-america/ (accessed 16 
December 2008). 
6  “Russia, Venezuela to Hold Joint Air Force Drills in 2009,” RIA Novosti (Russian News and 
Information Agency), 31 October 2008, 1.  http://en.rian.ru/world/20081031/118054642.html (accessed 11 
November 2008). 
7  Raylsiyaly Rivero, “A Fact of Life: Strategic Alliance for Venezuela and Russia,” Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs (online), 23 July 2008.  http://www.coha.org/2008/07/a-fact-of-life-strategic-alliance-
venezuela-and-russia/ (accessed 3 December 2008).  
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the primary actors.  Understanding the incentives and expectations of each actor with 
respect to the relationship permits a more accurate analysis of the relationship’s efficacy, 
as well as its prospective deterioration. 
It is impossible to discuss the relationship between Russia and Venezuela without 
addressing the effect of the United States.  The United States and Venezuela have 
historically been close, and the economic ties binding these two countries continue to 
remain strong.  The knot in these ties has consisted mainly of oil and sales of military 
hardware.  The United States needs the oil Venezuela can produce, and Venezuela 
requires assistance in extracting and refining that oil, as well military hardware and 
technology.8  With the rise of Chávez, Venezuela has begun to seek alternatives to long–
standing U.S. assistance.  
The curious emergence of Russia’s foreign policy involvement in the Western 
Hemisphere is one that is understandably unsettling for Washington.  From the U.S. 
perspective, Russia’s increased involvement in the Western Hemisphere coincides with a 
retreat in U.S.–Russian relations, which some argue was initiated by the U.S. refusal to 
extend the ABM treaty in 2003.9  Additionally, the Russian decision to enhance its Latin 
American presence corresponds with the rise of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.10  As the 
United States and Russia grow farther apart, Russia and Venezuela become increasingly 
close partners.  A potential danger for the United States resulting from this partnership 
could be Russian support of Chávez’s economic, political, and military policies centered 
on undermining the effect of U.S. policy and influence in its own hemisphere.  Given the 
differing U.S. and Russian views on geopolitical events in Georgia and elsewhere, the 
political climate in Venezuela provides Russia an opportunity to indirectly oppose U.S. 
foreign policy influence without overtly taking a stand against the United States.  In 
                                                 
8  Gawdat Bahgat, “The New Geopolitics of Oil: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia,” Orbis 
47, no. 3 (2003): 447-461. 
9  Bernd Kubbig, "America: Escaping the Legacy of the ABM Treaty," Contemporary Security Policy 
26, no. 3 (2005), 410-430. 
10  Chris Kraul and Patrick J. McDonnell, "Russia Seeking Inroads among Latin American Nations," 
Los Angeles Times (online), 27 November 2008, 1.  
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/europe/la-fg-medvedev27-2008nov27,0,4472657.story 
(accessed 11 December 2008). 
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addition to geopolitics, there are also more direct dangers such as Venezuela’s increased 
militarization and its effect on the threat perception of other Latin American countries.11  
This thesis will explore these potential difficulties created by increased Russian 
involvement in Venezuela. 
C. VENEZUELAN FOREIGN POLICY: IDEOLOGY OR PRAGMATISM? 
Much of the research focusing on Venezuela and Hugo Chávez contains frequent 
reference to the Venezuelan leader as a divisive influence in international relations.12  It 
would indeed be difficult to oppose this particular point of view.  As Michael Shifter 
notes, “[Chávez’s] speeches are peppered with virulent anti–U.S. rhetoric, charging 
Washington with imperialist designs and systematic exploitation of the poor.”13  Perhaps 
the best example of his penchant for discordant comment occurred during Chávez’s 
address to the United Nation in September 2006.  With metaphorical description of the 
U.S. President as “the Devil”, he effectively demonstrated his opposition to the U.S. 
administration and its associated policies toward Venezuela and Latin America as a 
whole.14  According to Chávez himself, the ultimate goal of his administration is the 
complete realization of the ‘Bolívarian Revolution’ and movement away from the United 
States as the single hegemonic power.15  The central planks of the Venezuelan 
administration’s foreign policy are characterized by opposition to neo–liberal economic 
policies, promotion of Venezuela as a regional leader, and materialization of international 
multi–polarity, which would serve as a check on U.S. power.16    
 
                                                 
11  Miguel Palacio and Alexander Gabuev, "Colombia the New Venezuela," Kommersant (online), 27 
May 2008, 1.  http://www.kommersant.com/p896309/arms_sales_Colombia/ (accessed 11 December 
2008). 
12  Mark J. Powell, “The U.S. and Chavez: To Confront or to Contain” Master’s Thesis, U.S. Naval 
War College, Newport, RI, Joint Military Operations Dept., 2006), 1-23. 
13  Michael Shifter, “In Search of Hugo Chavez,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006): 45-59. 
14  Hugo Chávez, “Chavez Address to the United Nations,” CommonDreams.Org News Center 20, 
(2006): 0920-0922. 
15  Richard Gott, Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution (Verso, 2005), 1-299. 
16  Harold A. Trinkunas, “Defining Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution,” Military Review 85, no. 4 
(2005): 39. 
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While there is no shortage of news articles or think tank pieces documenting 
Venezuela’s adversarial tone toward the United States, the emphasis on Chávez’s anti–
U.S. ideology leads to two shortcomings in the literature.  First, anything Chávez does is 
automatically viewed as detrimental to the United States (and U.S. relationships in the 
region).17  Overall, Chávez is perceived as a threat to American interests because of his 
views, but the exact nature and extent of that threat is based on conjecture rather than 
careful analysis.  Second, the focus on ideology leads many analysts to neglect other 
possible motivations for Chávez’s foreign policy, such as pragmatic economic gains or 
defensive military posturing.   When these possible factors are mentioned, it is as an 
antidote to the overemphasis on ideology and the relevance of Chávez’s worldview for 
foreign policy making tends to be judged as irrelevant or dismissed altogether.18   In both 
cases, there is no systematic analysis of the relative importance of different factors in 
shaping various dimensions of Venezuela’s foreign policy.  A central purpose of this 
thesis is to analyze the extent to which Chávez’s foreign policy is driven by ideology, 
economic pragmatism, security concerns or some combination thereof (in which an 
ideological worldview shapes Chávez’s understanding of his country’s economic and 
security interests).   
A review of Chávez foreign policy points to the use of oil profits and new 
regional institutions as the enabling forces behind many of his aggressive attempts to 
establish a new regionally based political infrastructure aimed at upsetting the Latin 
American status quo.19  The Bolívarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) is one such 
organization intended to subvert U.S. influence in the region by offering an economic 
alternative to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed 
                                                 
17  Pascal Fletcher, “Kerry Attacks Venezuela's Chavez,” Global Exchange (online), 22 March 2004, 
1.  http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/venezuela/1683.html (accessed 16 December 2008). 
18  Sanchez, Memorandum to the Press: Venezuela’s Security Factors and Foreign Policy Goals.  
http://www.coha.org/2007/05/memorandum-to-the-press-venezuelas-security-factors-and-policy-goals/.  
See also:  Alex Sanchez, “Venezuela’s Military in the Hugo Chávez Era,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
(online), 18 September 2008.  http://www.coha.org/2008/09/venezuelaâ™s-military-in-the-hugo-chavez-
era/ (accessed 16 December 2008).   
19  Genaro Arriagada, "Petropolitics in Latin America: A Review of Energy Policy and Regional 
Relations," working paper for Andean Working Group of Inter-American Dialogue, no. 12 (2006): 3-22. 
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Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).20  In addition to offering alternative 
institutions, Chávez has used profits from Venezuelan commodities to garner support for 
a broad left–wing movement in Latin America.  Electoral successes of Chávez allies have 
been noted in several Latin American elections, including Evo Morales in Bolivia and 
Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.21  Two other leftist candidates, Peru’s Ollanta Humala and 
Mexico’s Manuel Lopez–Obrador, narrowly missed victory at the polls, as well.22  The 
image of Chávez and his ardent support for favored candidates played a large role in 
these elections, whether positive or negative.  Oil money may have also found its way 
into the coffers of the Forces for the Armed Revolution of Colombia, or FARC.  In spring 
of 2008, following a Colombian raid on the FARC across their border with Ecuador, 
Colombia claimed to have discovered computer evidence of promises of large–scale 
Venezuelan monetary support for the FARC rebels.23 
There is little doubt that oil prices have enabled Chávez to execute a far more 
aggressive foreign policy than would ever have been possible previously.  Clearly, the 
influence wielded by both Russia and Venezuela in the energy sector is formidable, and 
neither country hides the fact that energy policy is the mechanism for providing 
economic security and expanding political clout on the international stage.24  Under 
Chávez, Venezuela has set out to directly follow this path.25  It has formed PetroCaribe, a 
regional arrangement, which allows Caribbean purchasers of Venezuelan oil to pay off 
half of the current oil price within 25 years using cash or alternative products (e.g., sugar, 
                                                 
20  Gregory Albo, "The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism," paper presented 
as part of International Development Week at University of Alberta from York University Department of 
Political Science, Alberta, Canada, January 2006, 1-14. 
21  Jorge G. Castaneda, “Latin America's Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006), 28-43.  See 
also: John Hammond, “Latin America: A Resurgent Left?” New Politics 11, no. 4 (2008), 40. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Juan Forero, “FARC Computer Files are Authentic, Interpol Probe Finds,” Washington Post 
(online), 15 May 2008.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/05/15/AR2008051504153.html (accessed 12 December 2008). 
24  A. Cohen, "The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency," Heritage Foundation 
Lecture# 1021 (2007).  See also:  Russia: Ukraine, Europe and the Natural Gas Cutoff, 2008.  
 25  Cohen, The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency.  See also:  H. Yanes, "The Cuba-
Venezuela Alliance: ‘Emancipatory Neo-Bolivarismo’ or Totalitarian Expansion?” Institute for Cuban & 
Cuban-American Studies Occasional Paper Series, University of Miami, (2005). 
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bananas, rice).26  PetroSur is another agreement between Venezuela and several other 
South American nations, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, to promote cooperation 
between state–run oil companies.27  Venezuelan entry into Mercosur, ALBA (as 
mentioned earlier), and several other efforts by Chávez are also aimed at increasing 
Venezuelan political and economic influence through effective utilization of oil 
production and selective distribution.28   
Aggressive policy efforts are also associated with more aggressive costs, and it is 
this particular facet that encourages researchers to conclude that Chávez’s policies and 
the economics behind them are simply not sustainable.29  As oil goes, so goes 
Venezuelan international ability.  This raises a series of questions.  Will ideology figure 
as prominently in Chávez’s foreign policy once resources run short?  Will relationships 
forged by Chávez turn out to be merely fleeting encounters that evaporate as soon as the 
oil money lubricant is gone?  This question is one that should be asked about Russia, as 
well, in lieu of a recent drop in oil prices.30  In the case of the Russian–Venezuelan 
relationship, the general opinion is that a decrease in oil prices will undercut Venezuelan 
ability to purchase Russian arms and offer attractive oil development contracts to Russian 
companies.31  Such a scenario would certainly test the bond of ideology as the substance 
giving life to the Russian–Venezuelan relationship.  If the relationship is strategic, or if 
the two countries share an ideology, one might expect to see a greater resolve from both 
 
                                                 
26  S. Ellner, “Toward a ‘Multipolar World’: Using Oil Diplomacy to Sever Venezuela’s 
Dependence,” NACLA Report on the Americas, (September-October 2007), 15-43. 
27  Ibid.  See also:  J. A. Cirino, "Latin America ‘Populism for the XXI Century’," gwu.edu (online), 
Fall 2006, 1-22.  http://www.gwu.edu/~clai/recent_events/2006/060921-NeoPopulism_Cirino_Paper.pdf 
(accessed 20 January 2009). 
28  Ibid. 
29  Mark Weisbrot and Lewis Sandoval, “Update: The Venezuela Economy in the Chávez Years,” 
special report for Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), February 2008, 5-23. 
30  Christian Schmollinger and Grant Smith, “Crude Oil Futures Drop After U.S. Senate Rejects Auto 
Bailout,” Bloomberg (Online), 12 December 2008, 1.  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601091&sid=aWtLCDffqFYY&refer=india (accessed 12 
December 2008). 
31  Kurt Weyland, “Will Chavez Lose His Luster?” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6 (2001), 73-87. See also:  
Shifter, In Search of Hugo Chavez. 
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sides trump temporal fluctuations of price.  If the relationship is primarily business, low 
prices could seemingly lead to distancing between the countries.  Some contend that high 
oil prices may be necessary for Chávez to maintain his power within Venezuela.32 
D. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND RUSSIAN–VENEZUELAN 
RELATIONS 
Russia has long held a prominent place in the hearts and minds of scholars 
primarily as a result of its position as a world superpower for many years.  There are two 
main thoughts that seek to explain post Cold War Russian behavior.  Some argue that the 
paradigm best illuminating the logic for Russian action is one that assumes Russia is 
intent on resuming its role as a major power, regardless of the potential international 
friction this might cause.  According to an article produced by the Heritage Foundation, 
the Russian government holds the view that U.S. hegemony and the “unipolar world 
order it allegedly promotes” are a “major threat to the Russian state.”33  If this is the case, 
Medvedev and Chávez share a common, ideologically driven view of the United States, 
one that sees U.S. hegemony as a threat to the democratization of relations between 
states.  In contrast, Dmitry Trenin contends that Russia’s foreign policy and international 
relations are best explained by its exclusive desire for economic accumulation.34  Again, 
both perspectives (ideology and economics) are useful in explaining Russian foreign 
policy actions, and, just as in the case of Venezuela, the difficulty lies in determining how 
important each is in the decision to pursue a specific policy objective or alliance.  
A complementary, although somewhat psychological, aspect of Russian decision 
making has been presented by Kathleen Hancock.  She has noted that Russia’s perception 
of itself as a unique regional superpower with a storied history and a wealth of natural 
resources is not well supported by its relatively weak economic foundation.35  Her effort 
                                                 
32  Weyland, Will Chavez Lose His Luster? 
33  Steven Johnson, Ariel Cohen, and William L. T. Schirano, “Countering Hugo Chávez's Anti-U.S. 
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34  Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West,” The Washington 
Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2007): 95-106. 
35  Kathleen J. Hancock, “Russia: Great Power Image Versus Economic Reality,” Asian Perspective 
31, no. 4 (2007): 71-98. 
 9
is effective at outlining the Russian administration’s psychology used to make decisions 
on the international stage.  In a similar light, students of Venezuela experience a dilemma 
in that scholarly concentration is placed on the regime’s ideology.  The practical, sensible 
justification for policy remains out of focus, eclipsed by the more sensational element—
the often flamboyant fashion in which Chávez announces and articulates the policy in 
question.  In both cases, it is easy to become disillusioned with Russian and Venezuelan 
self–perception and to allow it to become an impediment to understanding.  Indeed, a 
central area of research, which this thesis seeks to advance, is how self–perception affects 
the foreign policy calculus of both Russia and Venezuela.       
A notable deficiency in literature covering Russian foreign policy is the failure to 
address the particular interactions between Russia and other states since the demise of the 
Soviet Union.  To date, there has been little examination and measurement of the 
relationships into which Russia has entered under Putin, and now under Medvedev.  
These contemporary relationships are charting the course for an entirely new Russia, a 
Russia that has emerged more powerful than ever before, and yet there is little attention 
paid to how Russia has wielded that increased power and for what reasons.  Multiple 
decisions by Russia to cut the flow of natural gas into several countries during the middle 
of a very cold winter in order to force payment and improve Russian negotiating position 
have not gone unnoticed, but the significance of these actions has been largely ignored by 
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While more coercive than the petrol politics of Venezuela37, the effect has been 
successful for Russian foreign policy and Russia continually resorts to this same tactic, 
most recently during the winter of 2008–2009.38  Without a doubt, energy has been the 
catalyst that has propelled Russian economic and political growth, and Russia has worked 
hard to expand its control over energy resources heading to the European Union and 
elsewhere.  Events in Georgia in 2008 seemingly took the United States and other 
countries by surprise, in spite of the fact that Russia has maintained and repeatedly used 
troops in that country since the very beginning of its transition to democracy in 1993.39  
The original decision to deploy Iskander missiles in response to the U.S. missile shield in 
Poland, although recently reversed, provides further amplification of the character of 
Russian foreign policy.40  In a crude comparison with Venezuela, although both utilize 
energy to achieve policy goals, Russia uses energy as a stick, while Chávez offers it as a 
carrot.  Complete control over energy policy by a highly centralized government enjoying 
concentrated political–economic power offers a very effective tool by which foreign 
policy goals can be obtained.41  This small amount of knowledge regarding foreign 
policy tools of both countries, while somewhat insightful, cannot easily be applied to 
produce a direct understanding of the Russian–Venezuelan relationship.   
Given the newness of Russian–Venezuelan relations, relatively little scholarship 
has been devoted specifically to understanding this budding alliance. The few analyses 
that exist attempt to ascertain and describe the motivation for maintaining the 
                                                 
37  For discussion of Venezuelan oil politics see:  Genaro A. Herrera, "Petróleo y Gas En América 
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relationship, but fail to explain conditions for either potential growth or termination.42  
The one exception is a short article written by Mark Katz in 2006 that evaluates the 
working dynamics of the relationship as a basis for discussing possible scenarios for both 
the growth and demise of the relationship.43  This thesis expands upon the argument 
advanced by Katz by providing a more in–depth examination of the relationship between 
Russia and Venezuela and an updated vision that seeks to understand the strategic 
significance, if any, of the relationship’s continued development over the past few years.  
The thesis will analyze the significance of these events for the relationship’s growth or 
dissolution as well.    
Finally, the recent decline in oil prices raises important new questions about the 
future of the Russian–Venezuelan relationship.  The arrival of a commodity boom 
generating high oil prices satisfied conditions necessary for each of these two countries to 
dabble in previously unexplored international realms.44  Given the centrality of oil and 
energy to the foreign policy efforts of Russia and Venezuela, the thesis will examine the 
extent to which a decline in oil prices has led (and is likely to lead in the future) to a 
review and potential reordering of priorities that will affect the economic, ideological and 
strategic components of the bilateral relationship. 
E. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The recent warmth between Venezuela and Russia cannot find a logical 
explanatory basis in historic or geographic factors.  The two countries not natural 
geographic partners in trade, nor have they enjoyed benefits of a long–standing bilateral 
relationship.  The arrangements and agreements forged by these two countries over the 
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past seven years are new, unique, and unprecedented.  The newness of the relationship 
and the relative lack of familiarity of the partners create the potential for misperception of 
the other’s commitment to, and stake in, the relationship.  Unlike more formal alliances 
(e.g., NATO), there is no singular unifying effort or explicit ideology providing 
permanent context for the relationship.  The result is a blurred comprehension of what 
this increasingly close arrangement between Russia and Venezuela implies.  This 
degraded insight hampers effectiveness of foreign policy by introducing conjecture, 
assumption, and unknown variables into its construction.  
Clearly, there would be no relationship between Russia and Venezuela if both 
parties did not stand to benefit significantly.  This thesis will detail the economic, 
political, and military interaction between Russia and Venezuela, assessing likely benefits 
and results for each.  At first glance, actions of these governments are most clearly 
understood when examined through the lens of neo–realism and its associated balance of 
power theories, both of which are derived from international relations theory.45   
Kenneth Waltz would likely argue that the actions of Russia and Venezuela serve 
to act as balancing behavior in the face of U.S. hegemony.  This idea is directly in line 
with his balance of power theory, which assumes that less powerful states will attempt to 
find a counterweight to the power of a very strong state.46  If the words and behavior of 
Chávez genuinely reflect his estimation of the United States, he perceives the United 
States as a threat with which Venezuela (and virtually every other similar country) is in 
competition.47  A gain in security for Venezuela is tantamount to a loss for the United 
States.  It would seem that the Chávez administration views its relationship with the 
United States from a realist perspective.  Given the original Russian reaction (announced 
deployment of missiles) to the American decision to deploy a missile shield in Europe 
(presumably a security gain for the United States and its allies), Russia is also operating 
from a realist standpoint with respect to its interaction with the United States. 
                                                 
45  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
46  Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
47  Brian Ellsworth, “Chavez Says Colombia and U.S. Plotting Invasion,” International Herald 
Tribune (online), 26 January 2008.  http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/01/26/america/OUKWD-UK-
VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA.php (accessed 19 November 2008). 
 13
In contrast, a liberal institutionalist approach would probably counter that the 
behavior expressed is not derived from fear of a hegemonic power, but rather from the 
potential benefit to be gained from cooperation between Russia and Venezuela.48  From 
this perspective, absolute economic gains rather than relative security gains motivate the 
relationship.49  This approach also has prima facie plausibility and its relevance as an 
explanation for different dimensions of the Russian–Venezuelan relationship will be 
examined in the thesis.   
Finally, a constructivist approach would stress the degree to which the relevance 
of economic and security issues for foreign policy, as well as views on absolute or 
relative gains, are shaped by the worldviews and perceptions of leaders and societies.50    
From this perspective, it is important not only to examine how Chávez and Putin’s 
worldviews shape particular foreign policy decisions, but also to understand how 
evolving perceptions of one another have shaped the relationship.  As Katz mentioned in 
his article, Russia was initially cautious going into the relationship with Venezuela, but 
for unspecified reasons this seems to have waned and a strategic component was added to 
the relationship.51  By evaluating how interaction affects perception, and how perception 
is likely to affect future interaction, new and different insights are possible.52  
As the preceding example suggests, it is essential to evaluate the evolution of the 
Russian–Venezuelan relationship to understand its true scope.  A simple snapshot of the 
economic or security interests served by the alliance at any point in time, is inadequate 
for revealing the factors motivating each of the partners in the relationship.  One key 
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question related to the evolution of the relationship is the extent to which it has been 
shaped by U.S. foreign policy actions and evolving Russian and Venezuelan perceptions 
of the threat posed by the United States.  Did the U.S. refusal to supply the Chávez 
administration with military hardware drive Venezuela into Russian arms?  On the other 
side, did U.S. renunciation of the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002 affect 
Russia’s perspective and lead to its withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe 
treaty (CFE) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)?53  If so, this would 
serve as an example for how the interplay between Russia and the United States 
influenced a less cooperative Russian stance (similar to Venezuela) and led to a common 
operating platform for Chávez and Putin.  Recent interaction between the United States 
and Russia54 provides ample material for a discussion on whether or not each action is 
predicated upon the previous action of the other, resulting in a series of tit for tat actions, 
which drive the two countries farther apart (and Russia and Venezuela closer together). 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Methodologically, this thesis will focus on the goals of Russia and Venezuela and 
their perception of how the alliance serves their foreign policy goals.  Final analysis will 
evaluate the effectiveness of the recent arrangement and explore the prospects for 
miscalculations in foreign policy emerging from differences in perception.  The 
timeframe explored travels back nine years to guarantee inclusion of the relationship’s 
origins.  Given Chávez’s ascent to power in 1998 and Russia’s tremendous economic 
struggle in the late 1990s, this is the timeframe best suited for an examination of the 
changes in both countries that cultivated the existing relationship.   
In discerning the overall strategy for Russia and Venezuela, it is best to begin 
with the most obvious sources.  Examination of statements, interviews, and speeches of 
the Presidents and other government leaders yield a good deal of information regarding 
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the goals for each administration.  While this may appear a painfully obvious technique 
loaded with material designed for consumption, there are several examples of situations 
in which countries have, either directly or indirectly, announced their intentions and 
goals, only to be ignored or overlooked by the target governments, as the announced 
strategy seemed impractical or illogical.  U.S. disregard for North Korea's goal of ending 
U.S. ship–borne electronic surveillance of its territory in 1968 serves as one such 
example55, as does the trivialization of the goals of Al Qaeda prior to 11 September 2001 
by U.S. leadership.  In sum, the best source for determining the underlying goal of an 
organization or government can be found in the scrutiny of their words and actions.  It is 
also important to examine how these words and actions are interpreted by the partner in 
an alliance. 
Toward this end, sources derived from both the Venezuelan and Russian 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs will be utilized to provide further information concerning 
agreements and arrangements, in addition to the unique perception of each actor.  The 
U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) and records of Congressional testimony will 
be utilized to document interaction of the actors, and also to provide U.S. governmental 
perception.  In addition, the scholarly material utilized will be drawn from English, 
Spanish, and Russian language sources in order to properly understand each side of the 
arrangement.  This also serves to protect the thesis from exposure to mirror imaging or 
miscommunication that occasionally occurs in sources that, although derived from one 
language, attempt to cover two actors that utilize two different languages. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW  
Chapter II of the thesis details the relationship between Russia and Venezuela and 
its gradual evolution over the course of the past nine years.  The role of oil economics, 
military sales, and the question of a strategic alliance figures prominently in this chapter, 
as these are defining characteristics in the relationship’s development.  Chapter III 
examines the way in which the realist and liberal paradigms of international relations 
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theory analyze the relationship and argues that a constructivist “perceptions” paradigm is 
needed. The final section of the chapter evaluates Russian and Venezuelan actions and 
perceptions (historic and current) in order to explain Russian and Venezuelan world 
views and their importance in the decision making process.  Chapter IV evaluates the role 
of the United States in the formation of Russian and Venezuelan policy, the strategic 
implications of the Russian–Venezuelan relationship, and its likely evolution. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN/VENEZUELAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
Although the relationship between Russia and Venezuela has only existed for a 
short time, its accelerated growth can be explained by mutual understanding derived 
through very similar recent experiences.  Both countries experienced economic hardships 
that gave way to political change and ultimately to a new national direction.  The 
common understanding produced by the recent history of both countries led them to 
abandon foreign–sponsored policies in favor of independent paths, ultimately bringing 
them together as partners in a relationship.  This relationship continues to readily 
generate energy and military arms sale agreements that benefit both parties.  More 
intriguing, however, is the claim by both sides that theirs is a strategic relationship.  
Before the question of whether or not the relationship is as strategic as claimed can be 
answered, however, close examination of the recent history of both parties is necessary in 
order to properly establish a baseline for the relationship. 
A. FORMATIVE HISTORY OF RUSSIA AND VENEZUELA 
The decisions of both Russia and Venezuela to enter into mutually cooperative 
agreements are better understood with fuller knowledge of internal changes, which have 
occurred in these countries over the past 15 years.  Both countries have experienced 
dramatic change in many ways, but in other aspects remain the same.  By reviewing the 
recent experiences of each country, it is possible to discern the conditions and context 
that have produced a mutual attraction between Russia and Venezuela. The failure of 
IMF policies (backed by Washington) to correct poor economic conditions in both 
countries and the prominence of U.S. influence in international affairs collectively 
sparked and fueled anti–Western, particularly anti–U.S., attitudes.  The success 
experienced by Russia and Venezuela after turning away from U.S.–backed policies, 




mutually attractive conventional wisdom that the best course is to oppose U.S. influence 
and policies.  The similar experiences in both countries established a common framework 
for policy that remains inherently opposed to U.S. foreign policy. 
1. Russia’s Post–transition Trauma and Attitudes toward the West 
Perhaps the most recognizable dramatic change of the twentieth century occurred 
in Eastern Europe as the former Soviet Union dissolved and gave rise to democratically 
oriented governments.  As the largest and most populous former member of the Soviet 
Union, Russia was a leader in implementing political change.  The political transition that 
spurred structural change inside the government of this country was extremely abrupt.  
This change that effectively ended the long–running Cold War was welcomed by NATO 
governments, as well as by those countries that had been subject to the yoke of 
communism for over 50 years. 
While certainly perceived as a positive development both for international 
relations and domestic considerations, the changes inherent to Russia’s transition exacted 
a considerable toll on the Russian economy and in the everyday lives of Russian citizens.  
As the economy also transitioned from a command economy to a free–market system, 
inflation spiked and it became virtually impossible for the average Russian to purchase 
even the most basic items.  In Russia’s first year removed from communism and a 
controlled economy, the gross domestic product slipped over 14 percent and prices rose 
by 1,735 percent.56  Inflation continued at over 800 percent annually until improvement 
was finally made in 1997.   
The international community, aware of the acute needs of Russia and its citizenry, 
moved to improve the precarious situation of the simultaneous Russian transition to 
democracy and free markets.  Monetary assistance from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was granted to assist Russia through this difficult period, thanks primarily to the 
United States and President Bill Clinton.  Unfortunately, it did little to improve the lives 
of Russian citizens, and many believed they were better off in the days of communism 
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than in the first five years of the new democratic and capitalist system.  In fact, the 
ineffectual results led to backlash against IMF policies, those who had supported their 
implementation, and the West, in general.57 
Hindsight provides strong indication that the IMF policies implemented were not 
very well suited to Russia’s unique situation.58  These reforms were so painful for the 
people of Russia in the short term some speculate they could not possibly have been 
introduced democratically.59  The outcome of the initial years of transition, dubbed a 
“virtual economy” by some, produced tremendous wealth for a very few and extreme 
difficulty for the rest.60  As capitalism took hold, Russia was forced to deal with versions 
of crime, corruption, and incompetence, which it had never before experienced.61  The 
learning curve proved extremely steep.  The failure of Washington–led IMF policies 
initiated by President Boris Yeltsin’s administration began to generate dissatisfaction 
with the West and with Yeltsin, as Russians “saw a causal connection between Western 
institutions and economic and regional disintegration” just as they had with the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1992.62  
The salvation for the Russian economy manifested itself in the form of increased 
energy prices, elimination of the “oligarchs,” and fiscal policy implemented by President 
Vladimir Putin upon succeeding Yeltsin in 2000.63  The economic situation and quality 
of life for Russians continued to improve as energy prices steadily climbed throughout 
President Putin’s time in office providing higher levels of income.  This relatively 
prosperous period observed a Russian effort to turn away from IMF policies espoused by 
the West and forge a new path.  The success of the effort, while often criticized for being 
significantly predicated upon commodity prices, has produced stability and led to far 
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better conditions for the Russian people than those experienced during the first days of 
the political and economic transition.  More importantly, this success inculcated a sense 
of Russian pride and correctness of action in spite of decreased political freedom and a 
trend toward political authoritarianism throughout this period.64  In 2000, the common 
Russian perception was that U.S.–backed assistance led to extremely difficult conditions 
for Russians and it wasn’t until Russia went its own way that things began to improve.65 
2. Venezuela’s Political Change and Resource–based Economy 
Prior to the initiation of democracy in 1958, Venezuela had experienced its share 
of dictatorial rule and governmental chaos.  Consolidation of President Rómulo Ernesto 
Betancourt’s efforts occurred in the form of a Constitution drafted just three years later in 
1961.66  By and large, the democracy established in Venezuela enjoyed a relatively 
steady level of support until the late 1980s and early 1990s.  During this period, 
Venezuela faced tremendous economic difficulty associated with declining oil prices, as 
the country’s economy was (and remains) dependent upon petroleum.  In response to the 
problem, President Carlos Pérez in 1989 sought to institute austere IMF policies to arrest 
the economic slide.67  The conflict created over the implementation of these policies 
resulted in riots, street violence, and several hundred Venezuelans killed. 
In February 1992, a Venezuelan Army officer, Hugo Chávez, led an unsuccessful 
coup attempt against President Carlos Pérez.  While the coup attempt ended in defeat and 
imprisonment for Chávez, it also thrust him into the Venezuelan national spotlight.  
Chávez and MBR 200 (his eventual political party) began to be viewed as champions of 
equality who were willing to confront an inept government that was incapable of solving 
the problems confronted by the majority of Venezuelans.  Chávez’s appearance on 
television in an effort to convince other coup participants to discontinue their efforts put a 
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face together with a name of someone who was willing to take a stand in support of 
workers and the poor.  As time passed, he began to be viewed by the overwhelming 
majority as a defender of the common man instead of a traitor.68      
In December 1993, Pérez was impeached and replaced by President Rafael 
Caldera.  President Caldera’s term featured a banking crisis, more declining oil prices, 
and eventually a painful recession in 1998.  The decade–long economic stagnation in 
Venezuela together with a high level of inequality provided opportunity for Chávez and 
his party in 1998.  In that year, the man who had been convicted of attempting to overturn 
the Venezuelan government was popularly elected to lead it.  Sensing the mood of the 
populace and understanding the pivotal nature of the opportunity presented, Chávez 
immediately used his support to dramatically and fundamentally change the Venezuelan 
government.  Within one year of his election, Chávez introduced referenda to create a 
constituent assembly, craft an entirely new Constitution, and have it approved.  All were 
passed, and Chávez successfully managed to change many key balancing features of the 
Venezuelan political system in just one year.69   
The same stimulus that provided Russia with a way out of economic despair in the 
very late 1990s and early 2000s also brought improvement to Venezuela.  The first four 
years of the Chávez presidency were politically unstable and economically costly, as 
evidenced by the attempted military coup in April 2002 and the oil strike in 2003.70  
However, the gradual, steady increase in energy prices provided a significant boost to the 
Venezuelan economy and to Chávez’s political capital.  The real (inflation–adjusted) 
gross domestic product of Venezuela increased over 87 percent from the second quarter 
of 2003 to February 2008, and the Venezuelan economy grew in 2006 and 2007 by 10.3 
and 8.4 percent, respectively.71  Whether attributable to Chávez and his policies or high 
oil prices, the Venezuelan economy has improved while he has been the head of 
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government.  The fact is that Chávez enjoys relatively decent approval ratings and he has 
already won reelection once.  His latest and most dramatic success was to remove term 
limits so that he will be eligible to run again in the 2012 Presidential election and 
beyond.72 
The Venezuelan experience is not dissimilar to that of Russia at the end of the 
1990s.  Both countries turned away from IMF–sponsored policies and relied upon a 
different direction for necessary improvement.  In so doing, the relative success of both 
countries created the conception that success could be obtained by turning away from 
U.S.–backed policies and pursuing other options.  In both the Russian and Venezuelan 
case, improvement was not forthcoming until after each country abandoned U.S.–
supported IMF policies.  The actual reasons for improvement are far more complex, but 
the common perception, one that is utilized rather frequently by Chávez, is that the 
interests of countries are best served by avoiding political or economic entanglement with 
the United States and by working toward a multipolar world.  Frankly put, thwarting U.S. 
influence and working to subvert U.S. policy is perceived by the leaders of both 
governments (and large sectors of the population who voted to elect those leaders) to be 
positive both domestically and for the international community. 
B. COMPONENTS OF THE RUSSIAN–VENEZUELAN RELATIONSHIP 
Joint agreements on weapons sales and energy agreements are the bedrock of the 
relationship between Russia and Venezuela.  These agreements have been present from 
the very beginning of the relationship, and they remain the focal point of efforts from 
both sides.  While other forms of interaction are also present in the relationship, most 
notably joint military exercises and technical exchange, energy and arms represent the 
lion’s share of the effort, thus far.  These efforts toward joint military exercises and 
military–technical exchange, both very recent additions to the relationship, presumably 
are demonstrative manifestations of the emerging strategic aspect discussed in the 
following section. 
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1. Military Hardware/Technical Support 
Venezuelan purchases of Russian military equipment represent the most extensive 
dimension of the Russian–Venezuelan relationship. The embryonic stages of the 
relationship began with the first visit of President Hugo Chávez to Moscow in May 2001, 
during which a framework was agreed upon by which Russia would sell Venezuela 
military hardware.73 After a second visit by Chávez to the Kremlin in October of the 
same year, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov returned the favor in December 
and announced Russia’s obligation to expand the market for its weapons by “tapping 
further into new countries.”74  While the initial May agreement and the announcement 
from Kasyanov were nonspecific, they laid the groundwork for eventual delivery of 
significant amounts of Russian weaponry to Venezuela.  These initial overtures did not 
bear fruit for several years, in spite of the proclaimed mutual desire for cooperation.   
The first concrete deal transacted between the two countries was formalized in 
early 2005 on the heels of a Chávez visit in November 2004 to Moscow and included the 
purchase of 100,000 AK–103 assault rifles, ammunition, and other light weaponry at a 
total of 54 million dollars.75  This agreement was carried out in spite of U.S. concerns 
that the number of weapons purchased exceeded the size of the Venezuelan Army, which 
numbered approximately 34,000 active personnel when the agreement was formalized.76  
On 3 April 2005, President Hugo Chávez announced plans to expand the Venezuelan 
reserve force created in 2004 from 80,000 personnel to 2.3 million volunteers, which 
would seemingly provide more than enough personnel for each rifle purchased.77  U.S. 
representatives were also worried that these weapons might end up in the hands of the 
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Forces for Armed Revolution of Colombia (FARC).78  Given the supposed 
documentation of a Chávez connection to the FARC on a recovered laptop computer, in 
hindsight this particular concern does not want for credible basis.79   
2006 saw Venezuela continuing to ramp up its purchases of Russian military gear, 
helping the Kremlin achieve what turned out to be its most successful year on the arms 
market.80  With total international arms sales of over 14 billion dollars in 2006, Russia 
doubled its previous record of 6 billion dollars set in 2004.  The Russian backlog of 
orders surpassed 30 billion dollars, which doubled the backlog from 2005.81  Venezuela’s 
portion of this Russian success included SU–30s, transport and attack helicopters, assault 
rifles, and construction of factories designed to produce ammunition for assault rifles.82  
While some of these agreements had been initiated during 2005, Venezuelan purchases of 
Russian military equipment accelerated through 2006 in tandem with a 33 percent rise in 
the defense budget to 2.08 billion dollars.  During the two year period of 2005–2006, 
Venezuela signed contracts with Russia to purchase weapons and other equipment that 
totaled around 1.5 billion dollars.  Both countries also participated in discussions 
concerning “SU–39 strike aircraft and Amur–class submarines, as well as air defense 
missile systems and infantry fighting vehicles.”83   
It was in 2006 that the United States banned further sales of military weapons 
systems to Venezuela.84  Prior to this ban, the United States had engaged other countries 
to convince them to discontinue business with Venezuela where arms sales were 
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concerned.  The most notable U.S. efforts in this area were the formal protest lodged with 
Russia at the end of 2004 concerning the deal for Russian assault rifles85 and the 
November 2005 U.S. request that Spain not carry through its agreement with Venezuela 
for coastal patrol boats and aircraft.86  In both cases, Spain and Russia declined to alter 
the plans in place to deliver military hardware to Venezuela.87  Spain, however, later 
recanted and cancelled the deal a few months later.  The United States was successful in 
preventing sales to Venezuela from Israel,88 Brazil,89 and France,90 as the items in 
question contained proprietary U.S. technology.  By choosing to formalize a weapons ban 
on Venezuela, the United States simply documented what had already been its unofficial 
policy. 
The U.S. efforts to dissuade other countries from selling military equipment to 
Venezuela may actually have served as a catalyst for crystallization of the Russian and 
Venezuelan relationship insomuch as military sales are involved.  With the United States 
having reduced Chávez’s options for weapons suppliers, it is somewhat natural that the 
Venezuelan President continued and expanded efforts to cooperate with Presidents Putin 
and Medvedev on military arms agreements.  For Russia’s part, the United States assisted 
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in knocking out competition that might otherwise have provided balance to Venezuela’s 
decision making on arms purchases and suppliers.  The manifestation of Russia’s 
preferred status as an arms supplier to Venezuela was evidenced the following year in 
2007, when two major agreements were signed indicating Venezuelan purchases of five 
Kilo–class submarines complete with torpedoes, anti–ship missiles, and land attack 
missiles.91  These purchases found support in the Venezuelan defense budget for 2007, 
which increased yet again to 2.56 billion dollars.92  The context of the arms deals 
between the two countries also changed to include longer time horizons for future deals 
(until 2013) and multiple deal contracts spread over greater periods of time.93 
President Chávez’s trip to Russia in September 2008 saw yet another 
demonstration of Venezuelan desire to purchase military equipment.  The Russian media 
reported that the Venezuelan leader wished to acquire 20 air defense systems and several 
submarines for a total value of over one billion U.S. dollars.  Chávez himself indicated to 
ITAR–TASS (the Russian press agency) that he also wanted tanks.94  One interesting 
note regarding the agreements discussed in June and September was the Russian promise 
of one billion U.S. dollars in loans for Venezuela to purchase military equipment.95  
Venezuelan willingness to utilize loans to purchase military equipment represents a 
continuation of the “Umbrella Law,” which enables the military to purchase weapons 
through overseas funding sources.  Previously, the Venezuelan finance ministry had 
proposed that this funding mechanism be gradually eliminated and future procurements 
be funded by the regular budget, including foreign reserves and oil income surpluses.96 
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2. Energy and Economic Agreements 
In 2000, the same year during which Russian President Vladimir Putin took over 
the reins of government from Boris Yeltsin, bilateral trade between Russia and Venezuela 
grew by 350 percent.97  This spike in trade represented the beginnings of an increasingly 
fundamental aspect of the relationship between the two countries.  The evolution of the 
energy connection between these two countries holds major consequences for the 
remainder of the world.  Russia controls 26 percent of natural gas imports into Europe 
and this number is expected to reach between 40 and 50 percent by 2020.98  Venezuela, 
meanwhile, supplies the world’s largest energy consumer, the United States, with 11 
percent of its energy imports.99   
The ascendance of Putin and Chávez to power in the first years of the new 
millennium was accompanied by rising energy prices, which enabled both countries to 
emerge from the very difficult decade of the 1990s.  With both countries becoming 
economically feasible and more comfortable internationally as a result of rising energy 
prices, mutual cooperation in the energy sector manifested itself as a priority in the 
infancy of both Presidencies.100  In December 2001, much of the groundwork was laid 
for eventual cooperation on energy and economic matters with the establishment of a 
cooperation commission, a cooperative banking agreement to create favorable conditions 
for Venezuelan and Russian investors, and joint development of natural resources, to 
include construction of infrastructure for extraction and removal of those resources.101    
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The effect of Russian oil production on the dynamics of decisions made by the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) played a small part in the 
relationship between Russia and Venezuela.  Early on in the relationship, when oil prices 
were significantly less than the levels at which they peaked in 2008, Russia vacillated 
between support for and against OPEC’s goals.  This has been posited by some as a 
possible source of tension between the two sides that might have caused the strength of 
the relationship to be less than it might have otherwise been.102  Chávez, for his part, has, 
from the very beginning, been active in courting Russian (along with other countries’) 
cooperation with OPEC regarding coordinated cuts in output in order to manipulate 
market oil prices and thereby create “stability” for producers.103  These efforts, 
moderated by Chávez, between OPEC and non–OPEC countries have continued up to the 
present.104  The successful Venezuelan attempt to entice Russia to alter oil output in 
accordance with OPEC serve to reduce the loss of market share faced by OPEC countries 
(including Venezuela) during periods of reduced production (as non–OPEC countries’ 
output remains unchanged).105   
Since the beginnings of the relationship’s intensification under Chávez and Putin, 
both Venezuela and Russia have worked diligently to further extend cooperation in the 
energy realm.  Oil and gas have been by far the main focus of the agreements signed thus 
far.  Three agreements in 2002 were all centered on oil and gas.106  In November 2004 it 
was announced that Russia and Venezuela would sign more agreements opening 
“markets for oil and petrochemical products, building pipelines, and coordinating efforts 
aimed at” establishing “fair value” for heavy oil derivatives in the international 
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market.107  November 2005 saw what could begin to be described as a regularly 
scheduled series of economic and energy agreements.  Again, these agreements touched 
on oil and gas, but this time they also extended to deals made for energy exploration.108  
At this juncture, there were already 37 existing agreements covering cooperation on, or 
purchase of, military technology, finance, infrastructure, and energy.109   
The agreements continued to roll out from underneath the pens of Chávez and 
Putin in 2006, with new deals directed at assisting in construction of pipe making plants, 
further development of Venezuelan oil fields, long term development of the Venezuelan 
gas industry, and outlook for development of the country’s mineral base.110  Vagit 
Alekperov, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Russian oil company Lukoil, was also 
backed by the Kremlin in his attempts to purchase Venezuela’s 50 percent equity share in 
Germany’s Ruhr Oil refining group.111  In 2007, U.S. oil companies Exxon and Conoco 
Phillips walked away from Venezuela in response to stricter terms announced by the 
Venezuelan government for certain oil companies operating in Venezuela.112  The 
remaining companies faced levying of back taxes and were forced into holding minority 
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exploration and production of both oil and natural gas.  The Russian government, 
meanwhile, “made the suggestion to expand the list of companies working in Venezuela 
to include state–controlled Rosneft and Gazprom Neft.”113   
More recent energy agreements have become increasingly all–encompassing in 
nature.  In July 2008, during another Chávez visit to the Kremlin, Russian companies 
signed yet another set of cooperation agreements with the Venezuelan government.  
These agreements are more comprehensive than previous ones in that they provide for 
joint study (a renewal of the 2005 contract with Lukoil) and “joint production of extra 
heavy crude, improvement of crude quality, and export sales of the improved crude.”114  
It would seem that these agreements are the first which facilitate a joint enterprise in 
which every aspect of the oil cycle—from exploration for the oil to its sale on the 
international market—is covered by the agreement, allowing both countries to enjoy the 
profits.115 
While oil and gas certainly have stolen the show with regard to energy and 
economic agreements between Russia and Venezuela, there are other agreements 
covering different forms of energy that have been enacted.  In July 2006, the Russian 
company Tekhnopromexport and the Venezuelan government arrived at an agreement on 
construction of a 900 million dollar hydroelectric plant.116  Two months later, Russian 
Railways and the Elektrostal Heavy Machinery Plant were awarded participation in 
designing the Venezuelan railway system and production of rails.117  Of particular 
interest are the more recent agreements signed during President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit 
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to Venezuela, the first ever visit of a Russian President to that country.118  Prior to the 
visit, President Chávez announced that Russian and Venezuelan technical teams had 
already begun working on plans for a new nuclear reactor to be built in Zulia.119  This 
type of agreement on nuclear energy paves the way for cooperation in a technical field 
that has traditionally involved guarded technology.  Such cooperation has also opened the 
door to criticism from countries concerned with Venezuela’s connection to Iran, given 
international concern over the ambitious nuclear policy of that country.120 
In general, the energy and economic agreements between Russia and Venezuela 
demonstrate a mutually beneficial relationship that has grown increasingly close over the 
past 8 years.  Nationalization of the petroleum industry in Venezuela in 2006 facilitated 
state–to–state agreements between Russia and Venezuela for the joint development of 
Venezuela’s petroleum resources.121  Traditional foreign companies such as British 
Petroleum, Conoco–Phillips, and Exxon either left or lost significant amounts of their 
assets, permitting other foreign companies (particularly Lukoil and Gazprom) to increase 
the foothold established by way of earlier agreements.  In a broader sense, Russian 
companies have become the quickest, most effective means for entry into Venezuelan 
markets.  Venezuelan law stipulates that contracts and agreements with Russian 
participation are “without tender” and are “subject to several beneficial conditions” 
including fast track procedures and no competition.122  The benefits of association with 
Russian companies operating in Venezuela are perhaps best verified by “offers from 
foreigners to buy Russian businesses in order to receive priority treatment.”123 
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C. EMERGENCE OF A STRATEGIC COALITION? 
Venezuela, from the very first visit of President Hugo Chávez to Moscow in May 
2001, has sought to characterize its agreements with Russia as efforts of a larger 
“strategic alliance.”124  For the most part, Chávez’s declarations of an alliance with 
Russia were largely ignored or perceived to be more grandstanding than actual fact.  
Even leadership in Russia seemed to downplay its association with Venezuela, perhaps 
because it was unclear how long Chávez would remain in power.  If such concerns did 
contribute to a Russian exercise in caution, they were well–founded, as the Chávez 
administration faced multiple challenges to its authority in 2002.  The most well–known 
and often discussed of these was the coup attempt in April 2002, which saw Chávez 
removed from power for a period of days.125  The opposition was recognized very 
quickly by the United States, however Chávez was shortly returned to power due to 
pressure from the popular sector in Caracas.126  The massive increase in Venezuelan 
GDP from 2003 until 2008, along with political adjustments by the Chávez 
administration following the coup attempts in 2002 assisted the Venezuelan President in 
consolidating his power and ensured an improved level of stability for the Venezuelan 
relationship with Russia.127    
Since the political turbulence in the early days of his administration, President 
Chávez’s situation has become more stable and Russia has correspondingly moved 
incrementally closer with each passing year.  A “souring” of U.S.–Russian relations over 
Washington–backed events such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine, (which occurred simultaneous with Chávez’s November 2004 
visit), and U.S. action in Iraq may have also pushed the Russian viewpoint to conform 
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more closely with that of Chávez.128  Russian willingness to act in opposition to U.S. 
policy preferences followed suit, thereby transitioning the verbal context of the 
relationship with Venezuela to one of action.  With the strengthening of the Russian–
Venezuelan relationship, an answer to the fundamental enigma becomes even more 
important: does the relationship truly carry strategic weight for those involved?  
What the United States previously considered an innocuous nuisance on the 
international scene in very early 2000, is beginning to be perceived as a threat to U.S. 
interests in Latin America and elsewhere.  The close collaboration between these two 
countries has emerged as a concern for some in the U.S. government and has been 
discussed during sessions of Congress.129  There are, in fact, some indications that 
illustrate an evolution of the Russian–Venezuelan relationship from cautiously simple, 
mutually beneficial contracts to today’s complex, multifaceted agreements.  The complex 
recent agreements, championed as the fulfillment of the mutually expressed desire for a 
multipolar world, seem to provide evidence of a long–term, shared strategic thrust on the 
part of Russia and Venezuela.  For purposes of this thesis, in order for the relationship to 
be considered strategic, it must produce a series of results that support achievement of 
long–term goals derived from national interests.  While Chávez and Putin declared the 
relationship to be strategic very early on, thorough analysis of foreign policy goals and 
the relationship’s role in achieving them is required to determine if this is, in fact, the 
case. 
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III. THE RUSSIAN–VENEZUELAN RELATIONSHIP: THE 
CENTRALITY OF PERCEPTIONS 
The Russian–Venezuelan relationship offers a challenge to traditional, theoretical 
understanding of international relations.  The integrated approach to governance of those 
in control in both countries, influences the state to champion interests of the few.  In this 
scenario, perceptions and identities matter as much as acting rationally or maintaining a 
balance of power.  The attraction between Russia and Venezuela is intensified by this 
similar approach to governance and a shared wariness of U.S. international influence.  
Even though traditional theory may be challenged by the relationship, however, a 
thorough review of the origins and development of Russian and Venezuelan perceptions 
and world views provides the clarity necessary for understanding the ends toward which 
each is striving. 
A. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO RUSSIAN–VENEZUELAN 
RELATIONS 
The two dominant theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, are 
often used to analyze foreign policy and discern the paradigms in use during the decision 
making of states.  Utilization of these theories, while insightful and logical in some ways, 
does not provide the necessary insight required to fully understand or properly evaluate 
the Russian–Venezuelan relationship.  The realist and liberal constructs are unable to 
provide a conclusive, parsimonious analysis of the relationship because they are unable 
to, in the Russian and Venezuelan case, reflect the importance of world views in 
formation of national interests and foreign policy.  Injecting a constructivist paradigm 
into the analysis allows for a discussion of how world views might affect national 
interests. 
1. Assumptions in International Relations Theory Ignore Perspectives 
The realist and liberal theories of international relations rely upon several 
assumptions in order to advance explanations for state behavior.  To begin, each assumes 
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that the international system is anarchic.  As such, there is no controlling interest that 
levies rules or requirements for state action.130  Additionally, it is assumed that rational 
actors execute foreign policy in order to achieve and secure national interests.131  
Generally speaking, each of these theories has sufficiently withstood criticism to be 
considered one of today’s dominant theories of international relations.  However, the 
assumption that rational actors dominate decision making in international relations is 
questioned by many scholars and remains far from certain.132  Indeed, the question of 
rationality is decided based upon the observer’s own interpretation of what is rational.  
What makes perfect sense to one individual or culture may be incomprehensible to 
another.  
Not only does rationality present problems for liberal and realist usefulness as an 
explanation, but the assumption that foreign policy and international relations are aimed 
at achieving national interests is a stumbling block as well.  More correctly, it is the 
analysis of national interests that represents the problem.  Any evaluation of international 
relations with regard to national interests will necessarily pass judgment on what those 
interests are and how a state’s actions hope to achieve them.  Again, the same scenario is 
presented:  the observer’s interpretation is the deciding factor in defining the interests and 
the motivation behind actions of a given state.  In most cases, the observer naturally relies 
upon his or her own experiences and understanding to form an explanation.  With this 
approach, the perspective of the observer is as important as objective factors in shaping 
the analysis of the national interest.133  
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A constructivist, perceptions–based approach is necessary for a proper 
understanding of state interests.  This is especially true for interests of states with non–
diverse, less representative power structures, such as Russia and Venezuela.  Analysis of 
state action produced by such structures must pay close attention to the ideals and views 
of the individuals who craft policy.  The effect and influence of world views, thoughts, 
and feelings are magnified in a system where there are fewer checks and balances on 
authority, as they enjoy greater input into the decision making model (relative to more 
representative power structures).  This does not mean, however, that theory is without 
value in explaining international relations, but rather that theory alone cannot fully 
appreciate and understand the complexities involved with analyzing international 
relations. 
2. A Realist Assessment 
Supporters of the realist school of thought are encouraged by an examination of 
Venezuelan relations with Russia.  The statements and behavior of the Chávez 
administration demonstrate practical execution of a desire to utilize the relationship with 
Russia to update and improve its armed forces and further increase independence from 
U.S. influence.  When Chávez makes statements that paint the United States as a threat to 
Venezuela and all of Latin America,134 it is reasonable to believe that decisions to 
purchase weapons and conduct military exercises with Russia are sponsored by Chávez’s 
realist view of the world.   The Venezuelan President’s very public view of the United 
States has been consistent and increasingly adversarial since his first days in office.  If 
Chávez is a realist, the military exercises conducted in the fall of 2008 with Russia were 
originated by Venezuela precisely because they illustrated Venezuelan (and others’) 
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are correct, Venezuelan recognition of a U.S. threat fostered and encouraged 
establishment of a relationship with Russia by which the Venezuelan state can 
respond.136  
Russia’s presence in the relationship can also be explained from a realist 
perspective.  While the Kremlin may not feel as directly threatened as does Chávez, 
traditionally ingrained Russian priorities have also felt threatened by U.S. policy.  The 
U.S. missile shield in Poland, NATO expansion, and U.S. support of Georgia provide 
subjects that are used by the realist school of thought to explain Russia’s eagerness to 
participate in an alliance with Venezuela.137  A pro–Moscow political analyst has even 
indicated that the military exercises with Venezuela were Russia’s response to U.S. ship 
deployments to Georgia immediately following the conflict in August 2008.138  The most 
recent example of Russian realism was the Kremlin’s maneuver to influence the Kyrgyz 
government to evict the United States from a military base in that country that serves as a 
critical supply node for the U.S. and NATO effort in Afghanistan.  In this situation, 
power politics of Russia are being utilized to force the United States to run all of its 
initiatives through Moscow first.139  Realists believe that this type of behavior along with 
the relationship with Venezuela betray the Russian desire to strengthen its position 
relative to the United States. 
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The logic of realism as presented above certainly appears reasonable, especially 
when one considers that both parties in the relationship make it a point to highlight 
multipolarity as one of the critical factors motivating the relationship.140  However, 
realism is not able to successfully explain many questions that arise from examinations of 
Russian and Venezuelan foreign policy.  First, if the desire is to counter the power and 
influence of the global hegemon, how can Venezuela’s behavior be considered rational 
considering the degree to which the fate of the Venezuelan economy depends on U.S. 
purchase and refinement of its oil?  What happens if Venezuelan oil is no longer 
purchased by America?  How would the drastic drop in GDP affect Venezuela’s ability to 
counter U.S. influence?141  Also, while Chávez trumpets the need to protect Latin 
America from a U.S. security threat, and has attempted to garner support for a Latin 
American security alliance, these efforts clearly take a backseat to economic initiatives.  
Given the scope of Venezuelan economic ties with the United States and others, the 
“imperialism” and security “threat” of the United States is, in practice, much less of a 
concern than a realist explanation would convey.142  While Chávez may not be the most 
adoring of U.S. fans, his rhetorical warnings of U.S. domination and political distancing 
of Venezuela are at odds with the practical nature of a much closer U.S.–Venezuela 
agenda, notwithstanding stated efforts to increase diversification of Venezuelan oil 
exports as an effort to eliminate dependence on the U.S. market.143 
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There are problems with realist explanations on the Russian side, as well.  For 
example, if Russia is able to coerce the United States into negotiating with Moscow 
regarding how it will operate in Afghanistan and Central Asia, how does this political 
victory rebuff the United States or decrease the disparity in power?  While Russia may 
gain some input (assuming there are no other options for the United States), the foreign 
policy goals of the United States could still be met and U.S. influence in Central Asia 
would inevitably spread.  Further, the Russians offered assistance immediately upon the 
Kyrgyz announcement to expel the United States.144  This is more indicative of a power 
play designed to garner U.S. recognition of Russian status as the gatekeeper for issues in 
its near abroad.  Additionally, recent indications point to the notion that Moscow’s 
decision regarding the deployment of Iskander missiles could be reversed.145  Such a 
reversal would obviously be a step down from past rhetoric and would seem to add 
weight to very recent statements that Russia is interested in improving U.S.–Russian 
relations.  The relationship between Russia and Venezuela could be considered an 
outcome of a shared realist perspective, but there are a number of clues that call the 
validity of this assertion into question. 
3. Liberal Institutionalist Explanations 
The counterargument to realism is provided by theorists of liberalism.  This 
perspective argues that the real motivation for construction and maintenance of the 
Russian–Venezuelan relationship is the mutual economic and political benefit enjoyed by 
each member.146  Logic dictates a fair amount of mutual benefit for both countries 
resulting from the relationship; otherwise there would be no reason for it to exist.  While 
realists argue that the benefit or product is increased security through balancing, liberal 
proponents would take care to point out the economic and political advantages inherent 
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for each country.147  While realists focus on how a threat or perceived threat causes 
balancing and alliance building, liberal proponents describe the Russian–Venezuelan 
phenomenon as more likely motivated by the benefits of working together.148   
There is no denying that as a direct result of the relationship with Russia, Chávez 
is likely better able to pursue his desire of creating a regional alliance in Latin America, 
which would act as a counterweight to U.S. policy and interests.149  Venezuela secures 
Russian assistance on oil and gas issues (everything from price regulation to assistance 
with future exploration), military hardware, and expression of international political 
support for Chávez’s goals.150  Each of these three areas of cooperation is beneficial for 
Venezuela in both relative and absolute terms.  More importantly, together they boost the 
legitimacy of Chávez’s goals and stated vision for Venezuela and for the Latin American 
region.151  The open–ended, ever closer relationship with Russia serves as Venezuela’s 
proof that Latin America can find alternatives to what has traditionally been U.S. support 
and can create beneficial agreements.  While the viability of those alternatives may be up 
for debate, the result is that Venezuela can potentially be considered a leader and pioneer 
by others in the region.152  The gradual, leftward political trend in Latin America is 
perhaps an indicator of Chávez’s ability to influence neighbors in the region.  At the very 
least, it is circumstantial evidence of Chávez’s vision being shared by other Latin 
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America countries.153  Additionally, Russian–Venezuelan agreements that involve 
cooperation on energy projects inside other Latin American countries point to the 
conclusion that greater Latin America is indeed influenced by the Chávez vision of Latin 
America and twenty–first century socialism.154  Bolivia, for example, has not lacked 
foreign interest in developing its gas and oil resources.  If the agreement between Russia 
and Venezuela concerning development of Bolivian resources was predicated solely upon 
energy needs, what prevented this development from occurring several years before with 
the assistance of a different, non–Russian company or government?  Further, why was it 
necessary (or practical) for Venezuela to negotiate an agreement with Russia that 
involved Bolivia?  The relationship with Russia has produced an engine of legitimacy 
and recognition through which Venezuela has been able to build support for its agenda.   
The lack of a direct threat to Russia ostensibly verifies the suitability of liberalism 
as explicatory rationale for development of the Russian–Venezuelan relationship.  
Russia’s involvement with Venezuela in the vacuum of a persistent threat leads one to 
assume that the potential benefits are the deciding factor for Russia’s participation 
(versus a perceived threat).  As outlined previously, the economic benefits of the 
relationship with Venezuela are substantial for Russia.  Further, the deepening of 
involvement between the two countries brings Russia increased economic benefit as more 
and more of Latin America opens up to cooperative relations with Russia.155  The similar 
political goal shared by Venezuela and Russia of ensuring a multipolar world and 
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truly classic liberal form, the more these countries cooperate, the closer they become, the 
more similarly their aims develop, and the more beneficial the relationship turns out to be 
for all parties involved.156   
Before assigning liberalism as the primary motivation for the quickening of the 
relationship, however, it is imperative to understand how this characterization can 
become awkward in explaining the relations of Russia and Venezuela.  First, while 
benefits have increased for both parties as the relationship has progressed, the agreements 
have not necessarily become easier to negotiate.  Most recently, Chávez made several 
trips to Moscow to overcome Russian reluctance to loan Venezuela one billion dollars for 
arms purchases.157  It would appear that the trust common between allies is still not 
present several years after the initial agreements between the two countries.158   
Secondly, although cooperation can clearly be observed, there has been no serious 
effort aimed at building political or civil institutions between Russia and Venezuela that 
would preserve the gains made.  This is especially difficult to explain given how actively 
Chávez has attempted to build institutions in the Latin American region.159  The 
Venezuelan President has spearheaded several Latin American initiatives, as mentioned 
earlier, but has done relatively little to create the same kinds of ties with Russia that his 
country has with Cuba or Bolivia, to name two examples.160  Objectively, both sides do 
benefit, but (diverging from the liberal institutionalist model) there is little to substantiate 
the idea that the arrangement is more than a temporary convenience for both.  It is worth 
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remembering also that Chávez attempted to diversify purchases of arms, but was forced 
to rely almost exclusively on Russia, as it is one of the very few countries willing to sell 
weapons over U.S. objections.161 
Finally, and most problematically, while the cooperation between Russia and 
Venezuela may perhaps be a sign of two countries working together, the end toward 
which they are working is to challenge the world’s hegemon and promote multipolarity.  
This adversarial ambition, assuming it is rewarded, ultimately leads to a confrontation 
between a great (and probably frustrated) hegemonic power and a bloc of less powerful 
countries, which have banded together to balance the scales.  This is not at all indicative 
of liberalism leading to a smoother, more cooperative international system.  Instead, it is 
the epitome of realist rationalization for how and why the relationship is occurring.  The 
statements produced by Russia and Venezuela are ambiguous in this regard, as they tout 
the openness and beneficial nature of their relationship for Latin America, while 
simultaneously declaring the need and desire to counter hegemonic power and encourage 
a multipolar world.162 
4. The Alternative of Constructivism 
Realism and liberalism concentrate on the actions of states and attempt to unravel 
the inspiration behind them. The ultimate goal is to determine why states interact as they 
do and what effect this may have.  With this methodology, these two theories utilize 
explanations of state actions to evaluate the interests and desires of those states.  This 
certainly seems reasonable enough.  As has been demonstrated, however, there are often 
competing explanations for these actions and some actions simply cannot be justified by 
theory.  An alternative method for examining international relations is to use the 
constructivist model mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis.   
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The constructivist standard contemplates the role of identity and perception in the 
construction of national interests and subsequent policies designed to support those 
interests.163  Instead of observing the actions of states in order to explain why a country 
acts as it does, the focus is placed on understanding the societal aspects that inform state 
actions.164  The constructivist approach seeks to avoid theoretical entanglements resulting 
from diagnosis of state behavior, balance of power, and rational actor assumptions.  This 
approach examines how states and their leaders view the world, in general, and also how 
they view their counterparts in particular, in order to better understand state interaction in 
each given situation.  The view held is that each situation is unique and therefore state 
actions are not necessarily best characterized by one theory or explanation.  Identity and 
the diversity of world views, both personal and collective, really do matter, and they play 
as important a part as national interests or rational action in any equation aimed at better 
understanding state interaction.165   
Whether or not constructivism offers a predictive and parsimonious theory of 
international relations is an often debated topic.  According to a review of Alexander 
Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics166, Wendt attempted to create a 
“parsimonious systemic theory [of international relations]… this time from an ideational 
perspective.”167  Keohane, on the other hand, believes that Wendt’s effort did not 
produce a theory of international relations because there are “no propositions about state 
behavior.”168  This thesis does not address this debate but instead sets out to examine the 
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influence of perceptions, identities, and world views of Russian and Venezuelan 
governmental leaders on foreign policy behavior and state interests.  Constructivism 
supposes that interests and identities are “an important part determined by domestic 
rather than international factors.”169  The added value of constructivism, according to 
Wendt, is that it incorporates both internal and external forces in analyzing the 
construction of state interests and identities.170  
The goal of this theoretical discussion is not to determine which theory best 
explains the relationship between Russia and Venezuela, but simply to understand the 
primary theoretical approaches to that relationship.  This understanding, in combination 
with sound analysis of interaction between state perception, interests, and policy (internal 
and external), can better provide an accurate evaluation of the Russian/Venezuelan 
relationship.  In using constructivism, discussion of foreign policy of Russia or 
Venezuela, particularly where their relationship is concerned, must make room for both 
endogenous and exogenous considerations that influence or impact that foreign policy. 
B. THE CHALLENGE TO THEORY’S EXPLANATORY VALUE 
Evaluation of Russian and Venezuelan political circumstances has been the 
mainstay of analysis surrounding the connection between Russia and Venezuela.  Given 
the stated ambition of the relationship—to establish and enhance international 
multipolarity171—differences between the Russian–Venezuelan point of view and that of 
the United States and its political allies are front and center in the discussion.  In fact, 
much of the evaluative effort is dedicated to highlighting the unique political ideology of 
both the Chávez system of governance and the less personalistic Russian system.172  This 
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focus communicates the impression that ostensibly close ties between Russia and 
Venezuela may be facilitated by, and perhaps dependent upon, likeminded political 
ideology.  From this perspective, international solidarity is a natural outgrowth of the 
analogous domestic politics of each country, based on political engineering and the 
erosion of respect for human rights and democratic institutions.173   
As Russia and Venezuela function differently from other states, a perceptions 
paradigm is particularly important to explain their relationship.  The unique, integrated 
operation of the Russian and Venezuelan governments (together with other stakeholders) 
requires that any analysis incorporate a discussion of the effect of identity and perception 
on how state interests are formed. 
1. Integrated Politics, Economics, and Interest Formation in Russia and 
Venezuela 
The Russian and Venezuelan Presidents direct all aspects of interaction between 
their nations and other countries.  Chávez and Medvedev (formerly Putin) actively 
participate in the political realm, the economic realm, and the military–strategic realm.174  
As each of these realms remains under the control of the government, all three are 
available to be harnessed to work toward national interests.  In other states, while leaders 
discuss the same issues, there is a separation between the political/military aspects of 
international relations and agreements that may or may not produce a desired outcome.  
With state–owned energy companies and industry, Venezuela and Russia are able to 
guarantee the implementation of international economic agreements (though not 
necessarily their success).  In contrast, economic cooperation with the United States (for 
example) manifests itself in the form of trade agreements.  These agreements focus 
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mainly on removing tariffs and fostering conditions for free trade.175  However, 
execution of this free trade is dependent upon private individuals and businesses, 
independent from government control.   
The freedom enjoyed by Russian and Venezuelan leaders affords them an 
efficient, centralized decision–making process without fear of significant institutional 
constraints.  With far less (or better managed) political opposition than experienced in 
other countries, each leader is able to conclude agreements without fear of alteration or 
delay from domestic political processes.176  The result of this centralized Russian and 
Venezuelan system is a unique foundation for state interaction with certain prerequisites 
for continued interaction and agreement with other states.  In short, the feature of using 
state–controlled instruments to execute the requirements of agreements necessitates an 
exceedingly close relationship between interests of the state–controlled companies and 
national interests.177  The interests of Russia’s Gazprom in Venezuela and the energy 
interest of the Russian state in Venezuela arrive at the same destination.  
Correspondingly, PDVSA serves the interests of the Chávez administration where 
cooperation with Russia on energy related matters is concerned, and thus the national 
interests of Venezuela become its own interests.  What is good for Gazprom is good for 
the Russian government, and what is good for PDVSA is good for the Chávez 
administration.178 
                                                 
175  S. D. Cohen, The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles, Problems, 
and Proposals for Reform (Praeger/Greenwood, 2000). 
176  V. Gelman, "Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species?" Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 3 
(2005), 226-246.  See also:  J. Corrales and M. Penfold, "Venezuela: Crowding out the Opposition," 
Journal of Democracy 18, no. 2 (2007), 99. 
177  Zhuplev, Economic Internationalization of Russia: Roots, Trends, and Scenarios. 
178  D. Hults, "Petroleos De Venezuela, SA: The Right-Hand Man of the Government," Working 
paper # 70, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at the Center for Environmental Science and 
Policy, Stanford University, Stanford , CA,  (November 2007).   See also:  M. I. Goldman, "The Dog Barks 
but the Caravan Moves on," Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 15, no. 4 
(2007), 360-370. 
 49
2. Cooperation, Mutual Dependence, and Increased Requirement for 
Success 
If national interests are to be realized and secured in agreements and relations 
with other countries, cooperation between state–controlled entities and the state itself is 
paramount.  The state is dependent upon the proper functioning of the entity it controls, 
and the state–controlled entity is dependent upon the state to provide contracts and drum 
up international business.179  This interdependence increases the stakes of relations and 
agreements with other states and introduces the requirement for both the state and its 
controlled entity to actively manage these relations and agreements in order for them to 
be a success.180  If international relations or agreements involving state–owned or 
controlled entities are a failure, international and domestic political fallout will result.  
These efforts to avoid failure produce a collaborative management effort, which serves to 
narrow the scope of “national” interests, resulting in a more constrained definition of 
what is most important in a less free society.181  The collaborative management effort 
must be able to direct both the political and economic activities necessary for successful 
international agreements and relations with other countries.182  This phenomenon serves 
as the background for Krastev’s observation of how interests in Venezuela and Russia are 
not representative of the nation, but representative of those in control.183  With Venezuela 
and Russia, it is important to understand that those who construct foreign policy are 
exceptionally likely to be as concerned with the domestic political landscape and their 
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own standing in it as they are concerned about the issues it addresses.184  This is true for 
all politicians, but especially true for those who operate in the centralized and integrated 
framework described above. 
The Russian and Venezuelan governments’ reliance upon positive outcomes in 
state agreements and international relations produces an acute sensitivity to changes in 
the economic, political, or strategic–military spheres.  As changes occur, the 
administrations of each government actively respond in order to ensure the success of the 
state’s power structure and to avoid potential political fallout.185  While Russia uses a 
more refined approach to manage its situation, Chávez uses controversy and agitation to 
manage Venezuela’s situation.186  Ultimately, the reason for integrating the three 
previously mentioned spheres into the state’s international relations and international 
arrangements is that it provides the opportunity to extend the time horizon of control over 
their respective countries in both domestic and international matters.  While political 
control in Western Europe and the United States is understood to change hands based on 
an electoral cycle, political control in Russia and Venezuela is managed through electoral 
cycles.  The dynamism of Chávez and the sharing of power by the ‘siloviki’ (‘the 
powerful ones’) in Russia have produced states that concentrate on maintaining power for 
an indefinite period of time.187  The foreign policy of each government, along with its 
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possessed by the managers of the state and alleviation of anxiety arising from political 
uncertainty.188  Any change in a comfortable economic, political, or strategic–military 
agreement, whether internal or external, could potentially threaten that control. 
C. VENEZUELAN AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY PERCEPTIONS 
The manner in which Russia and Venezuela see the world is a product of both 
internal and external factors.  The origins and evolution of Russian and Venezuelan 
society, combined with experiences from interactions with other countries, have formed 
perceptions that are continually at work in each country’s foreign policy calculus.  
Explanations for the strong anti–U.S. sentiment that affects this calculus are better 
understood when the recent history of Russian and Venezuelan interaction with the 
United States is reviewed.  The world views of Chávez and Medvedev (previously Putin) 
and the uniquely integrated nature of the governments they control dictate the national 
interests and the path taken to secure those interests. 
1. Origins of Perceptions 
In an eloquently detailed description of Russian society and political culture from 
the earliest days to the middle of the 1980s, Edward Keenan explored the links between 
Russian village culture and late twentieth century Russian politics.  This culture featured 
a societal and political framework in which risk avoidance, suppression of individual 
initiative, informal political power, maintenance of stability, and a desire to achieve 
unanimity in resolving divisive issues dominated as the standards for making 
decisions.189  This arrangement produced a closed societal and political system with a 
strong inclination to reject outside influence.  Inside this system, personal affiliation and 
an ad hoc balance of others’ interests, as opposed to institutionalized political 
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structure, determined political status and function.190  Power and influence were 
conveyed by, and confined to, an individual’s office or proximity to an office holder.  For 
those firmly in control, change and progress represented the possibility of devaluation of 
political and social power.   
While the above descriptions characterize the internal domestic political system, it 
is important to understand how that system relates to, and interacts with, the outside 
world.  One interpretation is that the origin and evolution of Russian foreign policy can 
be understood by examining four persistent conditions: economic backwardness, 
permeable frontiers, a multicultural state and society, and cultural marginality.191  From 
very early on, economic backwardness created a vulnerability to outside coercion where 
Russian foreign policy was concerned.192  The second condition, the porous nature of 
Russia’s perimeter borders, also presented severe problems for stability and external 
security, especially as “the power of the Russian state weakened as it moved from the 
center to the periphery.”193 
Russia’s political system combined with these challenges to form a distinct 
paranoia that continued through the Soviet period in spite of the disappointment it 
brought.  This disappointment of the Soviet period traced earlier disappointment of 
nineteenth century reforms that also resulted in a feeling of “betrayal” by the West.  This 
myth of alleged betrayal generated an “us” versus “them” mentality and ideas of Russian 
superiority.  More importantly, this myth was used to justify policy (both foreign and 
domestic) and was instrumental in creating an anti–Western identity.  In carefully 
managing the paranoia by reviving the image of a strong “enemy” (the West), political 
leaders were able to call upon that anti–Western identity to strengthen their state during 
times of weakness.194   
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The Russian perception has consistently defaulted to identifying the West (or any 
other outside force) as hostile and confrontational toward Russian civilization and 
statehood. 195  This view continues to dominate the political reality of Russia today.196  In 
the Russian mindset, the failure of IMF policies to reverse the economic implosion 
immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s served to confirm the 
accuracy of this view.  The opening of Russia’s backward economy under these policies 
created opportunity for foreign investors and economic disaster for Russia.  Similarly, 
continued NATO expansion is perceived to cause security and stability dilemmas 
analogous to those faced by Russia previously.  Russia’s perception of itself and the 
international system is the product of a risk–averse, survivalist political system that has 
blurred the line between domestic and foreign policy for several hundred years.197      
While perceptions and societal development have directly influenced Russian 
foreign and domestic policy for hundreds of years, the situation in Venezuela is much 
different.  To begin, the development of Venezuela occurred in a much different fashion.  
Over the course of 1820–1830, Venezuela achieved and consolidated its independence 
from Spain.198  Since Venezuela was settled by the Spanish, their culture and influence 
were inherent in Venezuelan society, and remain so today.  Even the Monroe Doctrine, a 
document established in 1823, which outlined U.S. prerogative for intervention in Latin 
America on the basis of a European threat, predates complete consolidation of the 
Venezuelan state by several years.199  In something of a paradox, Simon Bolívar, revered 
and continuously invoked by Chávez as a great leader of Latin American revolution, 
foresaw this type of policy assisting the Latin American cause.  According to Bolívar, 
prosperity and development would occur “as soon as we are strong, under the auspices of 
a liberal nation that lends us its protection.”200  Although Bolívar may have been 
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somewhat suspicious of U.S. power in preferring an alliance with the British to 
counterbalance the United States (similar to Chávez’s pursuit of Russia to counterbalance 
the United States today), he recognized an unavoidable connection between the United 
States and Latin America.  Obviously, events did not transpire according to Bolívar’s 
vision.  Instead, Latin American development has consistently lagged behind 
development of every other region of the world with the exception of Africa.201   
Still, the origins of anti–U.S. or anti–Western perceptions affecting foreign policy 
did not really begin to appear until the middle of the twentieth century.  Certainly, there 
were brief occasions during which policies were designed to resist U.S. control over the 
hemisphere, but widespread, active opposition to U.S. policies did not find a serious 
voice until the middle of the twentieth century.  This opposition was predominately led 
by Fidel Castro in Cuba and other armed revolutionary movements elsewhere in Latin 
America.202  These movements found support in the academic world, as  “dependency 
theory” became popular.  Dependency theory holds that development does not depend 
solely on stages, but also upon a state’s “position within a single international economic 
structure of production and distribution.  This presupposes, on the other hand, a defined 
structure of relations of domination.”203  Essentially, as Michael Reid points out, the 
theory argued that “poor countries are poor because others are rich”, not because they 
“failed, for whatever other reason, to develop.”204 
Dependency theory grew to become very popular among Marxists, left–leaning 
scholars, and others in Latin America.  As capitalism and foreign influence were 
popularly believed to be directly responsible for poverty and failure in Latin America,205 
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authors began to speak of U.S. Marines and IMF missions (among other things) as 
“agents of plunder.”206  While these views did become a trendy academic explanation for 
Latin American underdevelopment, they were not manifest in the governmental policy of 
Venezuela.  However, institutionalized changes in the Venezuelan armed forces, 
declining oil prices in the 1980s, and austerity measures initiated by then–President 
Carlos Perez opened the door for political upheaval that ultimately led to an unsuccessful 
coup attempt in 1992, led by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez.207  Among the officers 
who spearheaded the rebellion, collectively known as Moviemiento Bolívariano 
Revolucionario 200 (MBR–200), most all were opposed to neoliberal economic policies, 
distrustful of foreign influence, and equated privatization of Venezuela’s state–owned 
industries to a loss of sovereignty and security.208  This group, and more importantly 
their views, made a comeback in the elections of 1998 when Hugo Chávez was elected 
President.  Since that time, Venezuela’s perception of the international system has been 
synonymous with Chávez’s views. 
2. Evolution of Perceptions 
Without a doubt, the most publicized feature of Venezuela’s foreign policy under 
Chávez is its growing distance from the United States and its allies.209  Prior to Chávez, 
relations between the United States and Venezuela were relatively cordial and mutually 
beneficial.  Clearly, the decision to move Venezuela away from the United States was 
inspired by his legendary distrust of foreign influence and neoliberal economic 
policies.210  What the U.S. government is (identity), and what it does (policy), as 
perceived by Chávez, remain inconsistent with what is necessary for Venezuela.211  For 
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some, the decision to increase the diplomatic divide between the United States and 
Venezuela could be attributed to lack of U.S. condemnation for the coup that sought to 
remove Chávez from power, U.S. refusal to continue selling Venezuela military 
hardware, or any number of other factors exogenous to the Venezuelan domestic political 
system.212  From this perspective, U.S. decisions of this type caused cooperation with the 
United States to be less beneficial for Venezuela and thus contributed to an anti–U.S. 
agenda, as incentives are insufficient and cooperation is antithetical to the goals of 
Venezuelan policy.213  
Such a conclusion, however, is insufficient as a singular explanation for why the 
United States and Venezuela have drifted further apart.  The fact is that the beliefs and 
world views of Chávez have contributed just as much to the distancing between the 
United States and Venezuela.214  As a self–proclaimed Maoist and devout advocate for 
socialism, his preference for international multipolarity, increased role of government, 
and centralization of economic and political matters inherently placed him at odds with 
the United States under the administration of George W. Bush.215  This difference of 
views manifested itself in Venezuela’s “vehement denunciation” of the Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), which was described as “limiting the ability of the 
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state to design and execute policies” on behalf of its people.216  Additionally, while 
somewhat melodramatic, Chávez’s phobia of U.S. engagement with Latin America, and 
especially with Colombia, has motivated him to tirelessly promote cooperation with 
Russia.217  This political cooperation has been sealed with state–controlled business in 
direct accordance with the Chávez model for what the state should do.218  These are but 
two examples of a consistent clash between Chávez and the United States.  Given the 
personal views of Chávez and the overwhelming reflection of those views in the 
Venezuelan government, it is difficult to envision a scenario that could have facilitated 
both the Chávez rise to power and continued success of the U.S.–Venezuelan relationship 
as it existed prior to his Presidency. 
Chávismo’s effect on Venezuelan foreign policy is clearly a factor endogenous to 
the Venezuelan domestic political system.  The intensity of the Chávez administration’s 
world views causes increased cooperation with the United States to be virtually 
impossible without wholesale changes to U.S. foreign and domestic policy.219  Chávez 
makes no secret of Venezuela’s goals to establish itself as an alternative for the Latin 
American region.220  The push to oppose U.S. policy in the Latin American region and 
around the world is not just inferred by state actions, but is actually a proclaimed goal 
about which Chávez boasts.221  Outside of the very necessary oil exports to the United 
States, there is remarkable correlation and consistency between Venezuelan actions and 
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its stated goals on the international stage.  The same message has been broadcast by 
Chávez from the very outset, and it is unlikely to change any time soon.  All rhetoric 
aside, however, the international actions of Chávez have specifically targeted the U.S. 
role in Latin America (and elsewhere), promotion of Venezuela as a regional leader (if 
not global), and the spread of socialism throughout Latin America.222   
Any explanation of Venezuelan foreign policy must reflect the profound impact 
of Chávez’s world views and perceptions of the international system.  While there is 
some political opposition, Chávez has been able to leverage the state and its resources 
multiple times to turn political setbacks into eventual triumph.223  The recent referendum 
victory ending Presidential term limits, the victory in the recall referendum in 2004, and 
the initial rewrite of the Constitution are all examples.224  Just when the political 
opposition gains a foothold, the resiliency of Chávez policies is demonstrated by their 
electoral success.  It is not foreign or domestic policy that matter in the Venezuelan 
political system, but rather Chávez policy.225  In the Venezuelan case, the increased level 
of centralized control without realistically strong checks or balances has caused 
Venezuela’s domestic and foreign policy to converge.  Indeed, Chávez is keen to remind 
us that defense of the Bolívarian revolution is the ultimate goal226 and its supranational 
character requires subordination of domestic considerations, possibly even their 
removal.227  Venezuela’s foreign policy goals have become indivisible from the goals of 
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Chávez as they are formed from his world view: a multipolar world, Venezuelan 
leadership in Latin America, opposition to neoliberal economics, and promotion of the 
Bolívarian revolution.228    
Just as Venezuela has turned away from the United States, Russia has gradually 
done the same.  However, this gradual distancing is less a result of anti–U.S. sentiment or 
personal resentment between leaders of state.  The currently cool relationship between 
Russia and the United States is more likely an indicator of Russian discomfort with U.S. 
foreign policy, particularly where Russia’s near abroad is concerned.229  The truth is that 
Russia would very much prefer to work with the United States on a number of issues.  
The recent Russian handling of the situation regarding the U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan is an 
example of Russian desire to sit across the table from the United States and once more 
negotiate global matters of real importance.230  This ability would reinforce Moscow’s 
self–perceived role as a heavyweight player on the international scene.  The desperation 
to engage in superpower relations is not limited to U.S. involvement in Russia’s near 
abroad, but is equally palpable in other areas of contention, such as U.S. planned missile 
defense, the conflict with Georgia, independence for Kosovo, nuclear arms agreements 
(as well as conventional), and several others.231 
The preference for negotiations with the United States in these areas is not 
motivated singularly by the psychological, or ideational, aspect.  While such a forum 
would perhaps be observed by some as Russia’s resurgence in a global leadership role, 
there is a pragmatic reason, as well.  Considering the extent to which the United States is 
politically and militarily extended in the war in Afghanistan and elsewhere, there is no 
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better opportunity than the present for Russia to be involved in negotiations with the 
United States.232  The United States finally needs something from Russia and will have to 
pay dearly for it, once Central Asian alternatives have been explored, exhausted, or taken 
away.  Not only will the United States be under pressure to make headway on 
Afghanistan, it will enter any such negotiations with a foreign policy team that has very 
little time in office, far less, in fact, than their Russian counterparts.233  Recent signals by 
Washington’s administration clearly convey the message that the United States is 
prepared to negotiate these global matters once more, and this time on Russia’s terms.234  
If the negotiations are successful, the pragmatic aspect of Russia’s current foreign policy 
will be as satisfying as the psychological comfort Russia would receive if it successfully 
recovered great power status.235 
While Russian foreign policy is informed by a distrust of outsiders, particularly 
the West, and while it is assertive in its near abroad, it does not directly confront the 
United States or other Western countries.236  There is no shortage of expressed Russian 
support for a multipolar world, but Russian policy does not hold its achievement as an 
imperative for the international community.237  In other words, in a departure from what 
is often repeated, Russia’s policy actions are not aimed at instilling multipolarity.  
Instead, it acts as it sees fit in each situation.  While Russia opposed the independence of 
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Kosovo, it was quick to recognize the independence of Abkhazia.238  Russian foreign 
policy goals are directed toward achieving what is best for Russia, as interpreted by its 
leaders.239  There are a great number of countries with which Russia is willing to work, 
virtually any country, in fact.  However, this does not mean that Russia is a champion of 
integrating with other states.  Rather, it lays bare Russia’s effective use of dual diplomacy 
that employs one set of rules to accommodate interaction with Iran (for example) and a 
different set of tenets when dealing with the United States.240 
Russian foreign policy today is far more sophisticated than was Soviet foreign 
policy.  Russia has managed to learn very quickly how to interact with other nations in 
order to achieve the goals of its foreign policy.241  This is a departure from Soviet policy 
that favored a combination of coercion, bribery, or hints in its attempts to secure and 
maintain foreign policy goals.242  As much of an improvement as this increased 
astuteness may be, it is important to remain aware of the fact that the world views and 
beliefs of those who make foreign policy may not have progressed as rapidly.  Russia’s 
foreign policy goals serve as a testament to this scenario.  While it has managed to 
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themselves have changed little.243  Other than the obligatory mention of human rights 
and internationalism, the priorities remain very similar to those crafted by President Putin 
in 2000: strengthening of security, international economic relations, and “effective means 
of international influence on the public opinion abroad.”244 
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IV. ASSESSING THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN–VENEZUELAN 
RELATIONS: REACTIVE AND STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS 
Chávez’s anti–U.S. rhetoric and Russia’s occasional saber rattling with the United 
States point to the fact that Russian and Venezuelan policy goals are designed with the 
United States in mind.  Policies put into play must be demonstrably independent from 
U.S. influence.  Given this, U.S. opinion and action are central to understanding Russia 
and Venezuela, as the policies, attitudes, and rhetoric of both are a specifically designed 
reaction to the United States.  Analyzing U.S. interaction with both countries is crucial 
for comprehension of Russian and Venezuelan policy motivation. 
An understanding of how Russia and Venezuela function on the international 
stage reveals the strategic aims of their relationship.  While the relationship is 
immediately and superficially beneficial for both parties, many developments are 
underway that inextricably link success or failure of policies of both sides to the 
relationship.  The level of investment by both countries has reached the point that the 
leaders of both sides are mortgaging their political future (and that of their countries) on 
the relationship’s success.  There remain several possibilities for tensions to arise 
between Russia and Venezuela, but the benefits for both provide sufficient incentives for 
continued cooperation.  Only a shift from the status quo by Russia or Venezuela, in either 
the relationship or on the international scene, is likely to upset the balance and lead to the 
relationship’s demise. 
A. THE U.S. ROLE—THE AMBIVALENT PROTAGONIST 
The recurring theme used by Russia and Venezuela to provide context for their 
relationship is that of “multipolarity.”  A multipolar world, more clearly defined as a 
world in which capabilities (between states) are equally distributed,245 is the goal toward 
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which each country is striving.246  A view of the United States as the world’s hegemonic 
power is central to the Venezuelan and Russian understanding of the international 
system.  As a result, the shared relationship between the two is influenced by, and 
directed against, the role of the United States as a unipolar force in international relations.  
In this way, U.S. actions play a crucially catalytic role to which Venezuela and Russia 
collectively react.  Analysis of the relationship is not possible without consideration of 
how they are influenced by U.S. policy and international action, especially as it concerns 
both Russian and Venezuelan national interests. 
1. Reorientation of Efforts, Redefinition of Interests after 11 September 
The terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 created massive change in 
American foreign policy.  Prior to 11 September 2001, the foreign policy of the United 
States operated in support of an entirely different paradigm.247  With the attack on 
America on 11 September, American interests were redefined and efforts were 
reoriented, just as they were after the attack on Pearl Harbor.248  Following the attacks, 
the Bush administration, somewhat coincidentally, adopted the foreign policy promoted 
by his opponent, Al Gore, during the general election. This policy advocated that the 
United States as the “natural leader” of the world should provide others the “blueprint 
that will help others be like us more.”249  Preemptive action in support of national 
interests (particularly security interests) of the United States and democracy promotion 
became the motivating forces behind foreign policy after 2001. 
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As the U.S. government carried out its fight against terrorism and the subsequent 
war in Iraq, other policy aspects were neglected.  One of the largest areas of neglect, 
which resulted from the policy shift, was that of U.S. policy toward Latin America.  In 
the first several months of his Presidency, President Bush indicated the U.S. relationship 
with Mexico was one of the most important relationships for the United States.250  
However, although some successes were achieved in Latin America, experts 
acknowledge the United States should have paid more attention to the region considering 
its huge energy resources and economic expansion.251  The Bush administration’s policy 
toward Latin America was in many ways typical of every other administration’s policy.  
Latin American expectations for improvement in relations with the United States are very 
high during U.S. Presidential campaigns.  Unfortunately, the results generated over the 
subsequent four to eight year terms are generally disappointing.252   
The significance of the Bush administration’s lack of attention toward Latin 
America is derived from the rise of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and his anti–U.S. 
influence on smaller countries in the region, most notably Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.  
While many scold the Bush administration’s handling of Latin America, there is no 
evidence that guarantees an all–out diplomatic effort geared toward Latin America would 
have yielded a better situation than currently exists between the United States and Latin 
America.  In fact, given the happenings of 2001, it is generally conceded that an 
alternative to Bush would likely have shifted policy away from Latin America in much 
the same manner.253  There is ample evidence to demonstrate that the mood of the U.S. 
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government became far more hawkish in the aftermath of the attacks,254 and Latin 
America simply was not on the minds of U.S. policymakers until after the effects of their 
new policies (or lack thereof) were felt abroad.  While U.S.–Latin American relations 
have seemingly followed the same ‘hope to disappointment’ pattern as under previous 
administrations,255 their poor condition is exacerbated and utilized by Hugo Chávez who 
has emerged as an influential force dedicated to leading the region away from ties with 
the United States.  
The same phenomenon occurred with U.S.–Russian relations.  Since the outbreak 
of the Global War on Terror, which the United States began to fight shortly after 11 
September 2001, U.S. responses and actions have consistently opposed Russian desires 
and preferences where the two countries have been concerned.  NATO expansion and 
U.S. departure from arms control and other international agreements are the examples 
previously mentioned that serve to demonstrate the large divide between U.S. and 
Russian positions.256  As the United States pursued its national interests under the Bush 
administration after 11 September 2001, it extended its reach into Central Asia by way of 
establishing bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  While President Putin initially 
provided his approval (whether or not it was necessary remains a subject of debate), 
eventually concern arose over the fact that Russia no longer exercised “sole influence” in 
their “legitimate sphere of interest.”257   
In short, the terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001 dramatically 
created an about face for a U.S. foreign policy that was previously intent on ensuring the 
United States would not “go around the world and say this is the way it’s got to be.”258  
Pursuit of the new, more active foreign policy began to create problems between the 
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United States and other international players.  While the United States sought to secure 
its national interests, these interests came into conflict with interests of other countries.  
The United States focused intently on rectifying the situation that had enabled the 
terrorist attacks while the remainder of the world focused on economic issues and their 
own regional security issues.  The conviction with which the United States pursued the 
war on terror, coupled with a gross overestimation of international support for the effort, 
produced an overly myopic, security–focused foreign policy that was unable to maintain 
relationships with countries whose interests were at odds with those of the United 
States.259 
2. U.S. Handling of Venezuela 
U.S. opinion regarding the Chávez regime plainly demonstrates the fact that the 
United States would prefer different leadership in Venezuela.  The initial years of 
Venezuela under Chávez were marked by U.S. frustration and irritation.260  The most 
telling sign of the U.S. preference for a Chávez alternative in Venezuela can be found by 
examining U.S. reaction to the April 2002 coup attempt carried out by Chávez’s political 
opposition.  Although the U.S. response to the series of events is somewhat disputed, an 
independent task force focused on U.S. policy toward Latin America has characterized 
the U.S. administration as “having seemingly endorsed” the military coup.261  Indeed, the 
U.S. handling of the situation has been described in some circles as evidence that U.S. 
disdain for Chávez was so strong that it affected U.S. “commitment to democratic 
institutions.”262  The Bush administration immediately acknowledged the new 
government formed after Chavez’s ouster, an action that violated the U.S. commitment to 
regional accords calling for the immediate denunciation of undemocratic changes in 
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government.263  As expected, the ensuing reaction from Latin American countries, and 
Venezuela in particular, was one of strong condemnation.  While this incident sparked 
the flames of anti–U.S. sentiment and rhetoric abroad, it led to a lack of U.S. engagement 
with Chávez, Venezuela, and Latin America, in general.  The coup against the Chávez 
regime, along with emerging post–11 September U.S. security priorities (Afghanistan and 
Iraq) toward the end of 2002, dramatically distanced the United States from Venezuela 
and Latin America.264   
Since then, U.S. response to policies of the Chávez administration has been very 
subdued.  While the Bush administration was dissatisfied with many of Chávez’s policies 
following the coup attempt, it maintained a ‘wait and see’ approach.  U.S. reaction to a 
second attempted coup in December 2002 and the oil workers’ strike was clearly muted 
and did not overtly demonstrate preferences of the Bush administration.265  Curiously, 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Shannon, indicated in October 2008 that the 
weapons acquired by Venezuela did not represent a threat as a threat involves doctrine, 
training, capacity.”266  This is a distinct departure in tone from previous U.S. reaction 
concerning Venezuelan arms purchases that, as outlined earlier, included active 
diplomatic efforts to stop Venezuelan purchases267 and expressions of concern.268   
The attitude projected by the U.S. government toward Venezuelan affairs has 
become increasingly ambivalent when Venezuela alone is the topic of discussion (as we 
will see, this is not necessarily the case where Venezuela and other states are concerned).  
Perhaps this is a natural response to the psychological realization that there is little that 
the United States can do to influence Venezuela, or perhaps it is designed to avoid 
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providing Chávez a pulpit for promulgating anti–U.S. discourse.  For whatever reason, 
U.S. statements have focused on concern for democratic institutions inside Venezuela 
and for countries Chávez has successfully influenced.  While this concern has been 
clearly expressed, there is little public reaction or discussion emanating from Washington 
regarding specific Venezuela’s foreign policy goals.269  Instead, Chávez is painted as a 
non–specific threat to the region.  In general, the United States can be described as 
having carefully handled Venezuela from a distance since the restoration of Chávez to 
power following the attempted coup in April 2002.270 
3. U.S. Handling of Russia 
The West, and particularly the United States, was intent on assisting Russia (as 
defined by the United States) as it emerged from communism.  However, the mechanisms 
utilized by the Clinton administration and its successor were ultimately counterproductive 
for positive relations between the two countries.  While the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) pumped billions of dollars in assistance into Russia following its abandonment of 
communism, the United States inadvertently took advantage of Russia’s weakness.  
Considering the new geopolitical reality, the Clinton administration worked to obtain as 
much as possible for the United States “politically, economically, and in terms of 
security” (NATO expansion) before Russia could complete its transition.271  The failure 
of IMF assistance to provide relief and the eventual failure of privatization to bring 
economic wellbeing, as expected by many in Russia, due to corruption and self–dealing 
began to create Russian animosity toward the United States and its policies.272   
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Under the Bush administration, the United States continued to expand NATO,273 
walked away from certain arms agreements with Russia,274 and began to perceive (and 
even more importantly, to publicly identify) Russia as a nondemocratic state.275  In fact, 
key U.S. political figures, most notably Senator John McCain, charged President Putin 
with staging a coup to consolidate autocratic rule.276  Meanwhile, NATO entertained the 
desires of both the Ukraine and Georgia to become members of the alliance, the former 
instance occurring in spite of the Ukrainian majority’s opposition to the move.277  In 
addition to granting candidate NATO membership to Georgia, the United States actively 
backed Georgia in its ethnic civil wars with separatists who are supported by Russia.278  
The U.S. decision to leave the ABM treaty was made as a result of the U.S. view that it 
had become irrelevant.279  In each of these three examples, the United States acted in 
direct opposition to what Russia had defined as its interests.  The logic motivating these 
U.S. decisions was contradictory.  On one hand, the United States claimed the ABM 
treaty was no longer necessary, as mutual nuclear deterrence no longer existed;  on the 
other hand, the United States worked to ensure Russia did not resort to its geopolitical 
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While the relationship between the United States and Russia started off well at the 
beginning of the first decade of this century, with the passage of time the two countries 
drifted further apart.  The relationship between Russia and America during this period 
was almost entirely predicated upon the personal relationship between Presidents Bush 
and Putin, the blossoming of which occurred simultaneous with the start of Russia’s 
relationship with Venezuela.  The promising friendship between Bush and Putin soon 
gave way to different realities.  While Russia pursued a foreign policy that focused on 
sovereignty and independence under Putin, the Bush administration embarked on a 
foreign policy that espoused action to deter future attacks and enact regime change.280  
These two types of policies obviously ran counter to each other and made it difficult for 
Russia and the United States to find themselves on the same side of many issues. Not 
surprisingly, as the two countries drifted further apart, the Bush administration faced 
increased pressure to “reevaluate” the “blank check policy” toward Russia and take a 
firmer stand against Russia.281  If Presidents Bush and Putin did, in fact, share a deep 
personal connection, it clearly did not carry over into their stewardship of their respective 
countries.    
American responses to increasingly assertive Russian international actions over 
the past few years have been notably restrained.  Russia’s intervention into Georgia in 
August 2008 motivated the United States to send ships and airplanes filled with 
humanitarian supplies, but the Bush administration took great care to avoid direct support 
of the Georgian military in any way.282  While any response with a military form would 
perhaps have been considered reckless by the international community, it is noteworthy 
that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili criticized the United States for not doing 
enough to help.283  In February 2009, the U.S. State Department called Russian plans to 
establish military bases in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
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regrettable, but did not express intentions to engage the international community or 
Russia itself concerning the alleged “violation of [Georgian] sovereignty.”284  In that 
same month, the United States refused to acknowledge Moscow’s hand in forcing 
negotiations with Russia for overland and over flight permissions critical to providing 
supplies to ongoing efforts in Afghanistan.285  As Russia has transitioned from an 
extremely weak state in the 1990s to a much more powerful international player in 
today’s world, the United States has transitioned from expanding (NATO) at Russia’s 
expense to maintaining the status quo.  U.S. responses over the past few months (that 
have produced little to no effect on Russian policy) have been relatively quiet, 
notwithstanding rhetoric necessary to stake out an opposing position. 
4. U.S. Governmental Commentary on the Russian–Venezuelan 
Relationship 
One of the more interesting aspects of the period, which facilitated the growth of 
the Russian–Venezuelan relationship, is the U.S. government’s apparent lack of concern 
for its development.  Official U.S. government remarks made throughout the course of 
the relationship’s development commented on Russia and Venezuela individually, never 
directly addressing the notion of any sort of an alliance having been formed between the 
two.  There are ample references illustrating the displeasure with which the U.S. 
government views the sale of weapons to Venezuela286 and other issues, but hindsight 
demonstrates that the U.S. government clearly does not believe the Russian–Venezuelan 
relationship is a legitimate force in the international arena.  In responding to reporters’ 
questions regarding the deployment of Russian ships to Venezuela in the fall of 2008, a 
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State Department spokesman made light of the effort by stating:  “I suppose if it is in fact 
true then they found a few ships that can make it that far.”287  This statement meshes with 
the more serious assessment given by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in which he 
described the Russian military as a shell of its former self.288   
Once those ships did manage to make Venezuelan ports, the military exercises 
between Venezuela and Russia in which they participated did not spark a concerned 
reaction from the United States.  In fact, when questioned about these exercises, ADM 
James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, downplayed the exercises and 
described them as holding no real consequence for the parties involved or for the United 
States.  To stress this point, he indicated that the United States is entirely unaffected from 
a security standpoint and that it will continue its operations in the region.289  The deputy 
director of intelligence at U.S. Southern Command remarked that the level of military 
cooperation was not in any way meaningful and that he did not believe they were really 
serious about putting together a military coalition.290  These sentiments echoed earlier 
statements from Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Shannon, when he stated that the 
military maneuvers do not represent a “military or geopolitical threat.”291   
While the U.S. government may not feel a military or geopolitical threat 
emanating from Russian–Venezuelan solidarity, it did feel compelled to represent its 
interests concerning Russian activity within Latin America.  A few months after making 
the above statement, Thomas Shannon travelled to Russia to engage the Medvedev 
administration regarding the Russian relationship with Latin America.  As Shannon 
remarked while in Moscow, the United States and Russia are “too important” to avoid 
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“working together on important issues in the [Latin American] region.”292  Shannon’s 
trip indicates a slight shift in U.S. government opinion concerning the bond shared by 
Russia and Venezuela.  U.S. officials had previously stated in October 2008 that the close 
relations between Russia and Venezuela were not an emerging security threat and that 
both countries were “pursuing different interests and different agendas, which makes 
their relationship unstable and not likely to be enduring.”293  The natural question that 
results is, if this assessment is correct and the relationship between Russia and Venezuela 
(by far Russia’s closest and busiest ally in the region) is not likely to endure, what 
prompted the need for a visit by Thomas Shannon to discuss Russian engagement in the 
region?  
One answer to this question is that the U.S. government actually is somewhat 
concerned with the ongoing interaction between Russia and Venezuela.  However, 
political niceties and a sensible desire to avoid worsening already poor relations between 
the United States and both Russia and Venezuela prevent the U.S. government from 
expressing concern over how the Russian–Venezuelan relationship may have the capacity 
to affect U.S. interests at home and abroad. 
B. INDICATIONS OF A LARGER, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
The first indication of the Russian–Venezuelan acquaintance transforming into a 
long–term strategic relationship was the increasing complexity and multifaceted nature of 
each subsequent agreement.  While Chávez has always maintained that Venezuela’s 
dealings with Russia are strategic, the initial agreements do not necessarily bear out this 
assertion.  For example, the terms of the initial agreements signed, such as the one for 
Russian assault rifles, were markedly simpler than the agreements that are currently being 
discussed.294  Whereas the early agreements were described in terms of cash for arms, the 
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more recent agreements offer and demand more than a ‘cash on the barrelhead’ 
proposition.  At least one of the agreements included a provision for one billion dollars in 
Russian loans to enable Venezuela to purchase Russian hardware.295  The recent arms 
agreements negotiated and agreed upon by Russia and Venezuela are accompanied in the 
same setting by economic, industrial, banking, and energy agreements.296  While early 
agreements also included a wide variety of items, more recent agreements move beyond a 
simple “buy and sell” relationship across many different fields and incorporate use of 
joint consortiums to fund loans to one side or the other or to further joint development 
projects (as described in the next two paragraphs). Although this isn’t necessarily unusual 
between friendly nations, the rapid development of such arrangements over a period of 
just a few years is quite striking and without precedent for either of the parties involved.    
There are additional factors by which the relationship can be described as 
strategic to both parties.  One of the more recent advances in the relationship is the 
advent of efforts aimed at establishing consortiums by which cooperation in multiple 
spheres can be more easily and readily carried out.  The first instance of this is the 
founding of a joint Russian–Venezuelan bank.  Both Russia and Venezuela agreed to this 
step in September 2008, although the original idea was introduced by then–President 
Vladimir Putin in 2006.297  On the heels of this September agreement, Venezuela’s 
finance minister, Ali Rodriguez, traveled to Russia to discuss formation of a bi–national 
investment bank.298 
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In October 2008, a consortium was formed between five Russian oil companies 
operating in Venezuela–Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom, TNK–BP, and Surgutneftegaz.299  
This move by these Russian companies anticipates creation of a larger energy 
conglomerate consisting of the five Russian companies and spearheaded by Petróleos de 
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela’s state run oil company.  Russian Energy Minister 
Sergei Shmatko has stated that investments will exceed “tens of billions of dollars.”300  
The idea behind the formation of this consortium is that both countries would be able to 
“share resources necessary for production and sale of oil and gas.”301  The complexion of 
the relationship is certainly different than it was just a few short years ago.  The 
negotiations between the two countries and the agreements they produce touch upon 
virtually every potential area for trade.  The context of the original agreements has 
continually been expanded to incorporate increasing levels of, and longer time horizons 
for, mutual cooperation.  Airline service between the two countries, Venezuelan 
automotive production, and construction of industrial mills are now routine subject matter 
in the course of negotiations.302   
The increasing importance of Russia as an arms supplier to Venezuela since 2006 
also makes it an essential strategic partner.  As recently as 2005, the majority of military 
hardware purchased by Venezuela did not originate from Russia, but rather from Spain, 
Brazil, and other countries.303  Today, however, Russian arms are by far the dominant 
force in Venezuelan weapons imports.  This increased Venezuelan dependency on Russia 
to satisfy military–technical needs and desires infers Russia will be a central component 
of Venezuela’s modernization and development of military capability far into the future.  
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The Russian decision to send strategic bombers to Venezuela in September 2008 
is another example of the increasingly strategic nature of the relationship.304  The 
bombers are seen as “strategic game–changers” and their deployment is used by Russia to 
send a response to the United States regarding U.S. policy in other areas of the world, 
most notably Poland and Georgia.305  While Russia only resumed flying strategic aircraft 
outside of its territory in 2007,306 the timing of the deployments to Venezuela is 
considered by some to be a definitive demonstration of strategic action designed to send a 
signal to the United States and others.307  In the same manner, the deployment of Russian 
ships to Venezuela for exercises in the Caribbean Sea is another example of the growing 
strategic dimension of the relationship.  The week prior to the arrival of the Russian 
strategic bombers in Venezuela, both countries announced plans for a visit from Russian 
military ships to Venezuelan ports, with the possibility of holding joint naval 
exercises.308  These exercises did, in fact, take place in November 2008, with the Russian 
participation consisting of a cruiser, an anti–submarine destroyer, and two support ships, 
along with 1600 marines.309   
The scope of the agreements and the level of commitment from both Russia and 
Venezuela clearly illustrate their belief in the strategic importance of the relationship.  
Both countries have invested massive amounts of time, money, and effort into the 
relationship and a positive return is expected by both sides.  Venezuela is almost 
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exclusively reliant upon Russia for weapons purchases and necessary technical expertise, 
and no other country has the capability (or has expressed the inclination) to work as 
closely with Venezuela as has Russia.  While the relationship may appear to be less 
strategic for Russia because it benefits Russian material interests, it also builds future 
Russian wealth, providing outlets for demonstration of a rebuilt international prowess.  
These benefits clearly match articulated foreign policy goals of Russia’s governmental 
leaders and the relationship seems to have been pursued, in part at least, in order to fulfill 
these strategic goals.   
Whatever the initial motivation for Russian military involvement with 
Venezuela—either short–term material interests or a concerted strategic effort—its 
evolution and current state provide evidence of a strategic framework guiding the 
relationship.  The contemporary foreign policies of Venezuela and Russia are so 
inextricably linked to the relationship that its demise would be extremely damaging to 
both parties’ efforts on the international scene.  Currently, neither Russia nor Venezuela 
would be able to replace the benefits each enjoys from the relationship, particularly the 
political benefits.  The benefits of Russian–Venezuelan cooperation have been so heavily 
trumpeted, both sides need the relationship to succeed in order to avoid failure.  While 
Russian foreign policy may be able to endure failure of its relationship with Venezuela, 
such a failure would seriously impact long–term strategic goals of Russia.  The 
relationship is relied upon by Russia to advance its international clout and long–term 
wealth.  Currently, there are no other alternatives that would be able to replace the long–
term economic and political benefits of the relationship with Russia.  Although the 
requirement for success is more immediate where Venezuela is concerned, this does not 
infer that the relationship is less important or less valuable for Russia.   
The increasing level of commitment by both sides influences the willingness to 
work harder and apply more purposeful effort toward realization of both sides’ goals, 
which have been incorporated into the framework of the relationship.  Chávez’s 
characterization of the Venezuelan relationship with Russia as strategic in nature310, 
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while it has taken several years to be believed, is now becoming accepted as fact by the 
Latin American region and international community, at large.  Jaime Daremblum, a 
former Costa Rican ambassador to the United States who now works for the Hudson 
Institute in Washington, DC, alludes to this and other “strategic partnerships” in a recent 
paper written to provide advice to the U.S. President–elect (now President Obama) 
concerning Latin American issues, calling it a “perfect storm” of challenges.311 
C. POSSIBLE TENSIONS IN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP 
While politics and rhetoric are sometimes inaccurate in detailing motivation for 
actions of particular states, they can be useful in providing a generalized opinion of one 
state in reference to another.  One of the main reasons offered by Chávez for such a close 
relationship with Russia is his desire for a multipolar world.  This theme is one that he 
has repeatedly utilized when speaking of Venezuela’s agreements with Russia.  In 
September of last year, following the aforementioned visit of Russian strategic bombers 
to Venezuela, Chávez explained that Latin America needed Russia for economic 
development, social development, and all around support.  He added that not only 
Venezuela, but Latin America as a whole needed “friends like Russia now as we are 
shedding [U.S.] domination.”312  These comments remain in line with the declaration 
signed very early on in the relationship (in May 2001) between the two countries that 
condemned U.S. “domination.”313  The Venezuelan President has always been a critic of 
strong U.S. influence on the international scene, and his efforts are pointedly aimed at 
countering U.S. influence and policy in the Latin American region.   
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Russia’s stance on U.S. influence in the world is considerably less vocal, although 
it is similar in nature to Venezuela’s.  As mentioned in the above paragraph, they, too, 
signed the May 2001 declaration “condemning alleged U.S. domination.”314  The notable 
difference in the Russian approach, however, is that Russia is less direct in its criticism.  
While Chávez clearly refers to the United States as a negative force in Latin America and 
the rest of the world, Russia prefers a less pointed approach.  While it is impossible to 
know for sure, the controversial declarations of Chávez and his aggressive persona 
possibly created a delay in Russian–Venezuelan meetings at the highest level, as Putin, 
who promised to visit Venezuela as early as 2002, has yet to do so.315  More recently, as 
the Moscow Times noted, “only a limited number of reporters were admitted to cover the 
meetings” between Medvedev and Chávez in July 2008, “fueling speculation that 
Chávez’s anti–U.S. rhetoric was uncomfortable [for] the Kremlin.”316  Coverage of the 
meetings from Kommersant, another Russian newspaper, describes Medvedev as “taken 
aback” by Chávez’s inclusion of his name in a list of “Latin America’s foremost leftist 
revolutionaries.”317 In spite of these concerns, Russia has been able to employ a suitably 
consistent euphemism that satisfies the demand for an adequate level of solidarity with 
Venezuela, yet avoids categorically pinning the blame for international catastrophes on 
the United States.  Russia, instead of countering the United States, will assist with 
“establishing a multipolar world.”  During the recent visit to Venezuela, Medvedev was 
careful to point out that Russian involvement is “not a market relationship or aimed at 
any other state, but is based on partnership.”318   
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Examination of the relationship between Russia and Venezuela reveals a myriad 
of interests in common.  Both President Medvedev and President Chávez are striving to 
continually develop the relationship to maximize its potential support for the policy goals 
of their respective administrations.  The energy linkages created by the agreements are 
considerable, so much so that it is difficult to foresee either country changing course.  
This is especially true considering the degree to which each country relies upon energy as 
the engine that drives its economy.  These links are reinforced by the economic and 
security benefits provided by the sale of Russian arms to Venezuela.  As we will see in 
the following two chapters, each country’s political stance with regard to the United 
States also encourages utilization of the relationship as a vehicle for promoting its 
strategic and political goals on the international scene.  At present, the relationship is 
stronger than ever before and it is difficult to foresee any change that would cause either 
side to reduce its role in the relationship. 
D. THE LOGIC OF THE RUSSIAN–VENEZUELAN RELATIONSHIP  
Thus far, the discussion has dealt with Russian and Venezuelan perceptions 
individually.  However, it is also necessary to use these same perceptions to examine the 
relationship that has formed between the two parties.  By examining the perceptions of 
each, it is possible to identify the likely objectives of both sides and how they intend to 
use the relationship as a vehicle for achieving foreign policy goals.  Ultimately, this 
examination should also reveal the fault lines upon which the relationship may begin to 
crumble.  While common perceptions may serve to bolster relations between Russia and 
Venezuela, misperceptions and divergent views can just as easily break it apart.  
1. Benefits of the Relationship 
As previous chapters showed, the relationship between Russia and Venezuela 
mainly touches on three different spheres—the economic sphere, the international 
political sphere, and the strategic–military sphere.  It is potential gains in these three areas 
that attract these two states to each other and compel them to continue their seemingly 
unnatural cooperation.   
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The aspect of the relationship that offers the maximum mutual benefit to both 
sides is the economic aspect.  By partnering with Russia, Venezuela is able to leverage 
technical expertise, which it does not possess in adequate supply, and realize 
development of its oil and gas fields.319  Additionally, Venezuela is able to share 
exploration and development costs associated with locating and producing oil 
(particularly in the Orinoco region), natural gas, and minerals.320  The degree to which 
Venezuela relies on these resources for maintaining economic stability cannot be 
overstated.  Venezuela is a resource economy, and has been since the discovery of oil 
underneath the surface of its territory.321  The assistance provided by Russia through the 
relationship opens the possibility for assistance in repairing depleted infrastructure caused 
by lack of long overdue reinvestment.322    
While Venezuela may see improvement in its leading economic sector due to 
Russian help, this benefit is shared with Russia.  As Russia takes advantage of the 
economic opportunities made available by the agreements with Venezuela, it is able to 
diversify business operations across two continents.323  Not only is Russia able to 
diversify operations of its main economic engine (the energy sector), it is able to do so 
while gaining exclusive access to what are potentially very lucrative sources of energy 
production.324  Recently concluded agreements have even provided Russia access to 
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potential sources that exist elsewhere in Latin America, most notably in Bolivia.325  
Business conducted between Venezuela and Russia is not limited to energy, although the 
energy sector is by far the largest contributor.  Agreements to date have also covered the 
airline, defense, and heavy industries.326  
The pure economic gain for each participant is adequate to motivate continued 
cooperation, and has been well documented.  However, one other possibility that is often 
overlooked is the pressure the new business consortium and inter–governmental 
commission may impart on international markets, most notably on the oil market.327  
Russia and Venezuela do have a history of working together to control oil output in order 
to stabilize prices and protect the economies of oil producing nations both inside and 
outside of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).328  Previously, 
these efforts have been fraught with indecision and reversals of verbal agreements, as 
Russia’s position outside of OPEC creates different incentives than exist for the countries 
inside OPEC.329  Thanks to the Russian and Venezuelan state companies’ union of effort 
and interests, however, any such cooperation would be far more likely in the future.  As 
Russian and Venezuelan energy interests in Venezuela become identical, what is good for 
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PDVSA is good for GAZPROM.330  In sum, the potential energy clout through collective 
price stability measures and agreements with OPEC countries and others is significant. 
In addition to the significant financial advantages of cooperation, the political 
advantages obtained are genuine considerations of both parties.  The relationship offers 
each an opportunity to highlight to the rest of the world their relevance as a major player 
on the international scene.  This is absolutely crucial for Venezuela, as the policy of 
Chávez places an ideology, the Bolívarian Revolution, above other priorities.331  As it 
has been defined, this revolution is a generic set of beliefs (opposition to free market 
economics, U.S. hegemony, and globalization) aimed at attracting like–minded 
supporters in Latin America.332  With Venezuela already in the grasp of this movement, 
it is critical this revolution be packaged for an audience external to Venezuela.  In order 
to attract followers, it is imperative that the messenger be judged strong and effective 
(legitimate), as well as persuasive.   
The initiative to join forces and successfully cooperate with Russia—a nation far 
removed from his own—is perceived by Chávez and his supporters as conclusive proof 
of his administration’s international prowess.333  Their hope is other governments in the 
region will view the progress between Russia and Venezuela and recognize it as a 
product of the Bolívarian Revolution and exclusive to the Chávez approach.  This would 
result in a tremendous political boost to Venezuela and to Chávez in terms of status, 
respect, and latitude for future action.334  Currently, Venezuela’s government is putting 
forth a massive effort to establish itself on the international scene.  This effort is 
corroborated by the list of international initiatives Chávez has sponsored, including 
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Venezuela’s attempt to gain a seat on the UN Security Council.335  Chávez understands 
the international arena will play host to the decisive struggle for advancing the revolution.  
For the revolution to succeed outside Venezuela, it is necessary that relationships (like 
the one with Russia) demonstrate the Bolívarian system’s international viability and 
legitimacy.  If the relationship fails, governments will question the ability of the 
Bolívarian revolution to produce legitimate results and act as a substitute for the 
international support usually provided by the United States in the hemisphere.     
Though the relationship is urgent for Chávez, it also offers Russia a tremendous 
reward, especially where that state’s long term international political goals are concerned.  
The relationship affords Russia the chance to express itself to the international 
community on broader issues.  Russian (and Venezuelan, for that matter) calls for a 
multipolar world offer an inkling of resentment about U.S. strength and willingness to be 
active internationally.336  Russian use of the relationship as a tactic to express its political 
disagreement with the United States and others on international issues, by selling arms 
over U.S. protests, for example, is a valid way for Russia to establish opposition to 
perceived U.S. hegemony.337  By establishing bona fides and a certain level of anti–U.S. 
credibility, Russia stands to be better positioned politically to court the interests of order–
breaker states that remain, willingly or otherwise, outside the influence of Washington.338  
Multipolarity has been somewhat of a buzz word between Moscow and Caracas and is 
consistently used by both to describe their mutual efforts, as well as their efforts with 
other states.339  The relationship with Venezuela, then, offers Russia political capital for 
use in its relations with other governments.  Even if the relationship with Venezuela is 
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not completely successful from the Russian standpoint (although it would certainly help), 
it can still be used to create this effect.  As long as Russia puts forth the appearance of a 
good faith effort in its relationship with Venezuela, this political advantage can be 
obtained.  
In addition to these short–term benefits, Russia views its relationship with 
Venezuela as evidence that it has begun  its rise from the ashes of the post Cold War 
period to resume its role as a great world power.  This, in fact, is a specific goal of 
Russian foreign policy, as outlined several times by Russian statements and actions.340  
The use of the relationship to express discontent over a particular instance of U.S. action 
or policy is a simple tactic that is easily understood and seized upon by many 
observers.341  However, using the relationship to advance the foreign policy goals of 
Russia over time transforms the tactic mentioned above into a cohesive strategy for 
achieving foreign policy goals and for conducting international relations.  From Russia’s 
point of view, consistent employment of this tactic will assist in restoring Russia’s place 
as a dominant member of the international order.  Should Russia’s exhibitions of 
solidarity for multipolarity and its ardent defense of state sovereignty triumphantly return 
Russia to such a globally influential position, the end result produces the following effect: 
a quasi–bipolar international system with the United States as one pole and Russia (and 
friends) as the other.  Given the recent Russian moves to influence affairs in Central Asia, 
this seems an outcome Russia would not mind achieving.342   
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Venezuela’s most obvious strategic–military benefits from the relationship arrive 
in the form of increased military capability leading to increased power both in absolute 
terms and relative to its neighbors.343  Although Chávez has claimed these acquisitions 
are necessary to defend against U.S. imperialism or any other threat (perhaps Colombia), 
it is unlikely that an attack is forthcoming.344  Still, these purchases are important to 
construct the image of a state that possesses adequate power to secure its interests and 
safeguard its authority and control.  This is doubly crucial for a state seeking to do so 
outside the confines of its own borders.  In the absence of real power (defined here as 
military capability), threats, assertions, and claims ring hollow and are viewed by others 
as less than legitimate.  The arms purchases carried out by the Chávez administration are 
strategically designed to promote and broadcast realist international legitimacy—the 
perception that Venezuela can muster the necessary force to maintain security and 
stability in defense of the Bolívarian revolution not only within Venezuela, but also 
throughout the greater Latin American region.345  
Discussions on Venezuela’s acquisition of military hardware fail to grasp this 
point.  They are primarily centered on whether or not Venezuelan acquisitions of 
weapons, made possible by the Russian–Venezuelan relationship, should concern 
governments in the region, particularly the neighbors of Venezuela346.  Generally 
speaking, weapons systems and military hardware are easily counted and their uses easily 
understood.  After all, it is reasonable to assume purchases of billions of dollars worth of 
military hardware imply they will, at some point, be used.  This yields a tendency for 
analysis of security situations to concentrate on capability with little regard for the 
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inclination to employ it.347  Governments reinforce this practice by traditionally 
estimating potential threats first on the basis of military hardware or fluctuations in a 
rival’s power and then by demonstrations of intent.348  The Russian–Venezuelan 
relationship’s effect on Latin American security may not be entirely clear, but Venezuela 
certainly possesses more military might (in absolute and relative terms) than it did 
previously.  This fact alone has caused some in the region to look unfavorably upon the 
relationship, further polarizing an already politically divided Latin America.349  
Pragmatic analysis of Venezuelan intent to utilize this increased military might for 
something other than military exercises (along with the lack of an appropriate 
opportunity), however, leads to the conclusion that the arms purchases, while perhaps 
strategic for the “national” interest, are less a threat to security and more a struggle for 
legitimacy.     
Whether the United States or others believe Venezuela is a viable regional force, 
or that Russia will once again become a superpower, is immaterial.  What does matter is 
how each state views itself and also how it is viewed by others, especially by prospective 
allies or business partners.  Is Russia a dominant force, or is it becoming one?  Do 
prospective allies consider the Venezuelan model a realistically feasible alternative for 
their country?  It is important to remember that in reality these questions are not 
answered by scholarly studies or by third party observers such as the United States.  
Instead, the answers are provided by governments in search of a suitable improvement 
model for their country and enlightened by entirely different, unique perceptions of 
themselves and the international system. 
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2. The Future of the Relationship 
In spite of the apparent multitude of benefits enjoyed by both Russia and 
Venezuela as a result of their relationship, there are scenarios that could potentially lead 
to its dissolution.  Most of these envision significant drops in energy prices, thereby 
pressuring the agendas of both Russia and Venezuela, individually as well as 
collectively.350  As each country’s economy is essentially resource–based351, energy 
markets are critical to maintaining GDP growth.  Energy’s ability to fund government 
policy in both of these countries has served to fuel the debate over whether or not the 
policies of both Russia and Venezuela are insulated well enough from variance in prices 
to remain sustainable.352  The generally held belief is that the policies of Chávez are 
unsustainable in their current form and will require modification and reinvestment in the 
country’s energy infrastructure.353  Russian policy and practice is generally considered to 
be under the same type of infrastructure pressure, although policy sustainability is 
presumed to rely more heavily on Russia’s ability to participate in international 
markets.354  The commonly arrived at economic conclusion is that Russian and 
Venezuelan international policy and expansive government spending will eventually be 
constrained due to administrative mismanagement355 and weakness in energy prices.356  
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If this turns out to be true, the effect of these constraints would logically serve to 
diminish the capacity of the relationship shared by these two countries. 
The truth is that Russia and Venezuela find themselves in that very scenario 
today, as energy prices have dropped dramatically since August 2008.357  While it is still 
too early to estimate the damage the drop in energy prices has caused to the relationship, 
the indications are that it has largely not affected the relationship between the two 
countries.  Interestingly, the parties involved seem to have found new areas of 
cooperation and increased existing levels in the face of the economic downturn in energy 
prices.358  For example, subsequent to the decline in oil prices, official announcements 
were made detailing potential for Russian use of Venezuelan and Cuban territory for 
basing strategic bombers.359  If economics have altered the relationship’s equation, the 
effect cannot yet be discerned.   
Any drop in energy prices is more likely to affect what the relationship is able to 
accomplish and not the goals of the relationship or the reasons for participation.  The 
relationship would undoubtedly be affected by such a phenomenon, but this does not 
necessarily mean that the relationship would be strained.  After all, it was not exclusively 
economics that created the relationship between Venezuela and Russia, but also their 
overlapping perception of geopolitical reality.  In the same way, this perceived reality 
will also have a hand in sponsoring the success or failure of the relationship.  While 
monetary concerns may place the relationship on pause, the relationship will not 
disintegrate unless other foundations change. 
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Rather than declining energy prices, the relationship is more likely to be affected 
by the level of commitment of each party.  Chávez is clearly and unequivocally 
committed to his policy of fighting free markets, opposing the United States, and 
exporting his Bolívarian Revolution.360  His entire political career is staked upon its 
perceived success inside of Venezuela, and, to some degree, his ability to make it 
palatable for some outside of Venezuela.361  The intensity with which he operates—the 
same intensity of beliefs that causes him to view the United States as a threat—leaves 
him little latitude for changing course.  Such a change would be disastrous for his 
political career.  The relationship he has built with Russia has arguably become the 
closest contemporary relationship between a Latin American country and any nation 
other than the United States.  Venezuela’s heavy investment in the relationship makes it 
very difficult to conceive of a better future opportunity for establishment of a U.S. 
alternative in Latin America.  For Venezuela, international perception of the 
relationship’s success is imperative for Chávez’s foreign policy success.  Just as 
Venezuela is truly ideologically committed to the Bolívarian movement through the 
policies of Chávez, it is also committed to the relationship with Russia.  
Russia’s participation, however, is not as deeply rooted.  While there are a 
number of benefits for Russia, particularly the long term economic prospects and the 
chance to be viewed as the strongest state–sponsored counter to U.S. hegemony,362 
Russia simply does not need the relationship as badly as does Venezuela.  While failure 
of the relationship would be a setback, it would not deal Russian aspirations as severe a 
blow as it would the ambitions of Chávez.  Further, Russia’s support for multipolarity 
does not extend beyond its relations with smaller nations, nor is it a topic of relations 
between Russia and the United States.  This duality has not gone unnoticed.  In fact, 
Russia has recently been challenged by some of its own partners who infer that Moscow 
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invokes the concept of multipolarity only to advance its own agenda.363  Given the 
foreign policy goal of reasserting Russian international strength, it seems unlikely that the 
international system’s polarity lies at the heart of the matter.364  If this is true, Russia’s 
expressions of commitment to Venezuela’s cause and the cause of multipolarity, in 
general, are more metaphorical than literal. 
The difference between the levels of commitment outlined above is the major 
fault line upon which the relationship may crack.  Venezuela, due to its enthusiastic anti–
U.S. policies, operates with a zero–sum approach toward the United States.365  Where the 
United States is involved, a gain for the United States is perceived as a loss for 
Venezuela, and vice versa.  Russia, on the other hand, does not share the same level of 
disdain for the United States, and does not perceive the United States to be as 
threatening.366  Russia does not believe that a U.S. gain is an unavoidable Russian loss.  
This difference in perception is one of the weak links of the relationship.  While both 
governments are using the same relationship, their different primary objectives—
advancement of an ideology (Venezuela) versus tangible political and economic benefits 
(Russia)—offer ample potential for the relationship to come undone.   
Consider a warming of relations between the United States and Russia.  If the 
United States and Russia began seriously discussing issues such as Central Asia, the U.S. 
proposed missile defense shield, or nuclear disarmament (something Moscow desperately 
wants), what would be the impact?  Russia would likely work with both Venezuela and 
the United States in an effort to maximize the gains from relations with both parties.  
Russia has, in fact, stated its willingness and supposed desire to move closer to the 
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United States.367  The potential effect of “even an insignificant warming” of relations has 
been already been pondered by Russian media interests.368  Such an occurrence would 
seriously undermine the legitimacy of Chávez’s anti–U.S. platform that bolsters his 
political standing in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America.  If Russia and the United 
States draw closer, it would be virtually impossible to maintain any credibility in saying 
that the Russian–Venezuelan relationship is an example of how states work together to 
reject the United States and free markets.  Should this happen, it would expose the bond 
of multipolarity and resistance to hegemons to be shallow, weak, and based more on 
ideology than substance.  This may be a distinct possibility, as Russia, which was 
seemingly cautious with respect to the Chávez agenda early on, does desire to engage the 
United States on major global issues.369  
Another possible scenario for the unraveling of the relationship could be triggered 
by Chávez.  If the Venezuelan President became aggressive toward his neighbors, 
perhaps a result of feeling sufficiently liberated by the revolutionary movement to export 
it elsewhere throughout the region, Russia would almost certainly back off in an effort to 
distance itself from provocative behavior.  Russia has other business interests in Latin 
America and, given its more pragmatic, dollars and cents approach to international 
relations, would shy away from doing anything to affect them in a negative way.370  This 
scenario may seem unlikely, but it is worth pointing out that Chávez support for the 
FARC could easily have been interpreted by Colombia in this manner.371  Also, 
Venezuela may even feel encouraged to act, buoyed by its feeling (perception) of Russian 
support.  Many claim this sort of behavior is characteristic of Georgian behavior 
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immediately prior to its conflict with Moscow:  feeling secure in its relationship with the 
United States, it discounted the plausibility of a Russian response, causing it to behave 
more recklessly than it otherwise would have.372  Both of the above scenarios deal with 
the notion of either Venezuela or Russia drifting from their status quo positions in the 
international arena to a new position with which their partner is not comfortable.  The 
relationship between these two countries has indeed benefited from the stability of these 
countries’ respective positions.  The more they remain stable in their world views, the 
more comfortable each becomes with the other.   
Still, even if the relationship remains intact, there is no guarantee that it will 
spawn the long–term benefits both participants are seeking.  If the primary goal of the 
relationship for Chávez and Russia is anything other than strictly business, everything 
depends on the perception of the observer, the state or the government for whose benefit 
the relationship is being touted.  If Russia is hoping to demonstrate to the United States 
its lack of appreciation for Washington assisting Georgia during the recent conflict, 
(which some purport to be the case),373 the United States must recognize the point being 
made and take it to heart (something which does not appear to have happened).374   
Therefore, just because the relationship exists intact does not mean that it will be 
free from frustration for either side.  Given the ideological bent of Chávez’s Bolívarian 
movement, this is more of a danger for Venezuela.  For Venezuela, the relationship must 
produce results with which Chávez can show Latin America the way forward.  It cannot 
stagnate; it must move forward and prove the benefit of the revolution.  If Latin 
American observers do not view the progress made as worthy of reorienting their own 
systems, the relationship will not have assisted in achieving Chávez’s main foreign policy 
goal.  While Chávez does relish poking the United States in the eye while being 
pragmatic, he needs successful foreign policy.  Much of his support inside of Venezuela 
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is derived from people who believe in the Bolívarian revolution and in a leading role for 
Venezuela internationally.  If Chávez’s policies are not able to achieve the revolution’s 
most important foreign policy goal (in other words, his policies fail to accommodate the 
revolution), voters may begin to look elsewhere for policies that effectively communicate 
and spread the Bolivarían revolution. 
This is undoubtedly part of the reason Venezuela is working the relationship with 
Russia as hard as it is.  Demonstration is only effective if it is completely understood and 
convincingly effective; such a result depends on the observer’s perception.  Thus far, the 
effect of the relationship on the regional strategic balance in Latin America is unclear, 
even if the geopolitical situation in the region has changed significantly since Chávez 
assumed control of Venezuela.375  On the global level, the relationship between Russia 
and Venezuela does not appear to have altered the global strategic balance.  The 
expectations for the relationship’s regional and international effect on this strategic 
balance are important to consider.  If each party’s expectations of the relationship are not 
adequately satisfied, the corresponding level of disappointment and frustration can 
contribute to questioning the relationship's purpose and value.  In this scenario, 
permissible atrophy is likely to occur. 
As a final note, it is important to remember that relations between states are often 
altered by differences in perception of strength and threat.  While one state may be far 
superior to another in terms of military might, strength alone does not preclude conflict.  
Most would agree the United States is the strongest state in the world, and need not worry 
over relationships formed between less powerful countries such as between Russia and 
Venezuela.  However, the decision of Russian and Venezuela to cooperate and build a 
relationship was arrived at using a calculus unavailable to the United States.  If both are 
as dedicated to a multipolar world as they advertise, and both continue to work in 
opposition to perceived U.S. hegemony, at some point the United States should expect its 
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interests in Latin America, if not elsewhere, to be challenged.  While the U.S. 
government may not perceive the relationship as a threat, this does not preclude Russia or 
Venezuela from making it so. 
 97
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Acharya, A. and A. I. Johnston. Crafting Cooperation: Regional International 
Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2007.  
 
Albo, G. "The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism." 
Presentation for International Development Week, University of Alberta, 2006. 
 
Albright, M. "Are Putin and Chávez the Future?" New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 2 
(2008): 75–78.  
 
Allen, S. R. "Soft Means and Hard Ends: Assessing Hugo Chávez’s Efforts to Counter 
United States Preponderance." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.  
 
Allison, G. T. and P. Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999.  
 
Alvarez, C. "Venezuela’s Oil–Based Economy." Council on Foreign Relations Press. 9 
February 2009. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas_oilbased_economy.html 
(accessed 11 February 2009).  
 
Ambrosio, T. Challenging America's Global Preeminence: Russia's Quest for 
Multipolarity. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005.  
 
Amsterdam, R. "The Russia–Venezuela Partnership: Strategic for Who?" 
robertamsterdam.com (online), 23 July 2008.  
http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/07/the_russiavenezuela_partnership.htm 
(accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
“Analysis: Russia–U.S. Fence Mending." United Press International (online), 15 May 
2001. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1–44293626.html (accessed 26 January 
2009). 
 
Arreaza, T. "ALBA: Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean." 
Amigos de Cuba, Vancouver, BC, 30 January 2004.  
 
Arriagada, G. "Petropolitics in Latin America: A Review of Energy Policy and Regional 
Relations." Andean Working Group: Working Paper 12, 2006. 
 




Babusiaux, D. “Panorama 2004: Oil Supply and Demand.” L’Institute français du 
Pétrole, 5 January 2004: 1–5.  http://www. ifp. fr/IFP/en/events/panorama/ 
(accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
Bahgat, G. “The New Geopolitics of Oil: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.” 
Orbis 47, no. 3 (2003): 447–461. 
 
Barkin, N. and K. Gehmlich. "Russia: Won't Install Missiles if no U.S. Shield." Reuters 
(online), 6 February 2009.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5154ZB20090206 (accessed 
25 February 2009).  
 
Barnard, A. “Russia and Venezuela Will Coordinate Energy Policies.” New York Times, 
23 July 2008.  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/europe/23russia.html 
(accessed 21 November 2008). 
 
Barry, E. "Russia Flexes Muscles in Oil Deal with Chávez." New York Times, 26 
September 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/americas/27russia.html?pagewanted=
1&_r=1 (accessed 21 November 2008). 
 
———. "Russia, and Putin, Assert Authority." New York Times, 11 August 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12putin.html?fta=y&pagewant
ed=all (accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Barshefsky, C. and J. T. Hill. U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: Report of an 
Independent Task Force. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2008.  
 
Bhadrakumar, M. "Venezuela, Russia: Comrades in Arms." Asia Times (online), 2 
August 2006. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/central_Asia/HH02Ag01.html 
(accessed 15 January 2009).  
 
Black, B. S., R. Kraakman, and A. S. Tarassova. "Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong?" Ekonomski Anali 44, no. 147–148 (2000): 29–
117.  
 
Blitzer, W. Transcripts from 'the Situation Room'. CNN.com (online), 2008. 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0809/28/ldtw.01.html (accessed 10 
February 2009).  
 
Blix, H. "U.S. Holds Key to Non–Proliferation." New Perspectives Quarterly 24, no. 1 
(2007): 27–30.  
 
 99
“Bolivian President to Arrive in Russia on Official Visit." RIA Novosti (Russian News 
and Information Agency) (online), 15 February 2009.  
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090215/120148726.html (accessed 20 March 2009).  
 
Bremmer, I. "Oil: A Bumpy Ride Ahead." World Policy Journal 25, no. 3 (2008): 89–94.  
 
———. "The Return of State Capitalism." Survival 50, no. 3 (2008): 55–64.  
 
———. "Who's in Charge in the Kremlin?" World Policy Journal 22, no. 4 (2005): 1.  
 
Bright, A. "U.S. Slaps Arms Sale Ban on Venezuela." Christian Science Monitor, 17 
May 2006. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0517/dailyUpdate.html (accessed 26 
January 2009). 
 
Bromley, M. and C. Perdomo. “CBM’s in Latin America and the Effect of Arms 
Acquisitions by Venezuela.” El Cano Royal Institute Working Papers 41, (2005). 
 
Bruce, C. “Fraternal Friction or Fraternal Fiction? The Gas Factor in Russian–Belarusian 
Relations.” Report from Oxford Institute for Energy Studies NG8, (March 2005): 
1–27. 
 
Bumiller, E. and L. Rohter. “Bush, Replying to Chávez, Urges Latin Americans to 
Follow U.S.” New York Times, 7 November, 2005. 
 
Cable, J. Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991; Political Applications of Limited Naval 
Force. New York: St. Martin's Press, 3rd ed., 1994. 
 
Cancel, D. "Chávez Tells Obama He should Follow Venezuela’s Socialist Path." 
Bloomberg.com (online), 6 March 2009. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aB6yw1ihGZ2k&ref
er=latin_america (accessed 18 March 2009).  
 
Cardoso, F. H. and E. Faletto. Dependencia y Desarrollo. Siglo, 2003.  
 
———. The Accidental President of Brazil: A Memoir. Public Affairs, 2006.  
 
“Caribbean and Latin America.” The Military Balance 107, no. 1 (2007): 51–92. 
http://www.iiss.org/publications/military–balance/the–military–balance–
2007/the–military–balance–2007/ (accessed 1 November 2008). 
 
———.” The Military Balance 108, no. 1 (2008), 55–100. 
http://www.iiss.org/publications/military–balance/the–military–balance–
2008/the–military–balance–2008/ (accessed 1 November 2008). 
 
 100
Carlson, C. "Chávez's Referendum Victory." SocialistWorker.org (online), 25 February 
2009. http://socialistworker.org/2009/02/25/chavez–referendum–victory (accessed 
18 March 2009).  
 
Carroll, R. and L. Harding. “Russia to Build Nuclear Reactor for Hugo Chávez.” The 
Guardian (online), 19 November 2008.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/19/venezuela–russia–nuclear–reactor 
(accessed 20 November 2008).  
 
Castaneda, J. G. “Latin America's Left Turn.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006): 28–43. 
 
———. "The Forgotten Relationship." Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (2003): 67–81.  
 
Cavan, S. "Russia's Multipolar Disorder." Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, 
and Policy (ISCIP), 24 November 2009.  http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news–
cms/news/?dept=732&id=51524 (accessed 19 March 2009).  
 
“Chavez Agreed to Arm Rebels, Files Indicate." The Washington Times, 10 May 2008. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/may/10/chavez–agreed–to–arm–
rebels–files–indicate/?page=2 (accessed 15 January 2009). 
 
“Chavez Applauds Spain for 'Resisting' U.S. on Arms." chinadaily.com (online), 28 
November 2005. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005–
11/28/content_498485.htm (accessed 16 January 2009). 
 
“Chávez Asks World to Halt Alleged Planned U.S. Attack on Iran." antara.co (online), 26 
March 2007. http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/3/26/chavez–asks–world–to–
halt–alleged–planned–us–attack–on–iran/ (accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
“Chávez Courts Russian Investment in Venezuela." International Herald Tribune 
(online), 29 June 2007. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/29/business/chavez.php (accessed 20 March 
2009).  
 
“Chavez Says Latin America Needs Russia." International Herald Tribune (online), 21 
September 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/21/europe/EU–Russia–
Venezuela.php (accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
“Chávez Says U.S. Fleet a Regional Threat." abcnews.com (online), 21 July 2008. 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=5285724 (accessed 22 
February 2009).  
 
“Chavez Set to Spend Big on Russian Weapons.” CNN.com (online), 22 July 2008. 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/22/chavez.russia/index.html 
(accessed 21 November 2008). 
 101
Chávez, H. “Chavez Address to the United Nations.” CommonDreams.Org News Center 
20, (2006): 0920–0922.  http://www.commondreams.org.views06/0920–22htm 
(accessed 30 October 2008). 
 
———. The South also Exists. LeftWord Books, 2005.  
 
Checkel, J. T. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.” World 
Politics 50, (1998): 324–348. 
 
Chislett, W. "Spain and the United States: So Close, Yet so Far." El Cano Royal Institute 
Working Papers 23, (25 September 2006). 
 
Chivers, C. "Chávez’s Bid for Russian Arms Pains U.S." New York Times, 16 August 
2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/world/europe/16russia.html (accessed 
15 January 2009). 
 
Cirino, J. A. "Latin America "Populism for the XXI Century." gwu.edu (online), Fall 
2006.   
 
Cleary, M. R. "Explaining the Left's Resurgence." Journal of Democracy 17, no. 4 
(2006): 35.  
 
Clough, L. "Energy Profile of Venezuela." Encyclopedia of Earth, 1 July 2008. 
https://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Venezuela (accessed 19 
March 2009).  
 
Cohen, A. "The National Security Consequences of Oil Dependency." Heritage 
Foundation Lecture # 1021 (2007). 
 
———. "Russia Provokes U.S. with Venezuela Sea Exercises." United Press 
International, 7 January 2009. 
http://www.upi.com/Security_Industry/2009/01/07/Russia_provokes_US_with_V
enezuela_sea_exercises/UPI–31861231367401/ (accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
Cohen, S. D. The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles, 
Problems, and Proposals for Reform. Praeger/Greenwood, 2000.  
 
Cohen, S. F. "The New American Cold War." The Nation 17, no. 2006 (2006): 1–9.  
 
Cohen, T. "Canadians Feeling Ignored by Bush." San Antonio Express–News, sec. A9, 09 




sec. 2009 (accessed 9 February 2009).  
 102
Cole, N. S. “Hugo Chavez and President Bush's Credibility Gap: The Struggle against 
U.S. Democracy Promotion.” International Political Science Review/ Revue 
Internationale De Science Politique 28, no. 4 (2007): 493. 
 
Coletta, D. “Unipolarity, Globalization, and the War on Terror: Why Security Studies 
should Refocus on Comparative Defense.” International Studies Review 9, no. 3 
(2007): 385–406. 
 
“Colombia Backs Chavez FARC Call.” BBC News—Americas (online), 10 June 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7444672.stm (accessed 12 December 2008). 
 
“Colombia's Conflict." Strategic Comments 13, no. 10 (2007): 1–2.  
 
Conetta, C. Losing Hearts and Minds: World Public Opinion and Post–9/11 U.S. Security 
Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Commonwealth Institute, 2006.  
 
Cooper, H. "Obama's War—Fearing another Quagmire in Afghanistan." The New York 
Times, 24 January 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/weekinreview/25cooper.html (accessed 19 
March 2009).  
 
Copeland, D. C. "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay." 
International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 187–212.  
 
Coronel, G. Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez's 
Venezuela. Cato Institute Center for Global Liberty & Prosperity, 2006.  
 
Corrales, J. "Hugo Boss." Foreign Policy 152, (2006): 32–40.  
 
Corrales, J. and M. Penfold. "Venezuela: Crowding Out the Opposition." Journal of 
Democracy 18, no. 2 (2007): 99.  
 
Crow, J. A. The Epic of Latin America. University of California Press, 1992.  
 
Dallen, R. “Chavez Says Venezuela and Russia Will Build a Nuclear Reactor in Oil–Rich 
Zulia.” Latin American Herald Tribune (Online), 3 December 2008. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=10717&ArticleId=320618, sec. 
Venezuela Links (accessed 3 December 2008). 
 
———. "Venezuela Says Russia to "Cooperate" with OPEC." Latin American Herald 
Tribune (online), 19 January 2009.  
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=321212&CategoryId=13280 (accessed 
21 January 2009). 
 
 103
Daniel, F. "Russia President, Warships to Venezuela to Counter U.S." Reuters (online), 
23 November 2008.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed2/idUSTRE4AM1Z720081123 
(accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Daremblum, J. "Putin’s Dangerous Games." The American, 12 January 2009. 
http://www.american.com/archive/2009/putin2019s–dangerous–games (accessed 
22 January 2009). 
 
Dobbs, L. Transcripts from 'Lou Dobbs this Week'. CNN.com (online), 2008. 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0809/28/ldtw.01.html (accessed 10 
February 2009).  
 
Doering, C. "U.S. Regrets Russia Plan for Bases in Georgia Regions." Reuters (online), 6 
February 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN06482295 
(accessed 9 February 2009).  
 
Donaldson, R. H. and J. L. Nogee. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, 
Enduring Interests. Mesharpe, 2005.  
 
Donath, K. "Putin's Puppet: Why Medvedev is no Liberal." Spiegel Online, 11 December 
2007. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,522688,00.html (accessed 
11 December 2008). 
 
Easter, G. M. "The Russian State in the Time of Putin." Post–Soviet Affairs 24, no. 3 
(2008): 199–230.  
 
Eggen, D. and K. DeYoung. "After Warnings to Moscow, U.S. has Few Options." The 
Washington Post, sec. A11, The Washington Post Company, 14 August 2008.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp–
dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081303752_pf.html (accessed 9 February 
2009).  
 
Ellner, S. "The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chávez and Alberto 
Fujimori." Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 01 (2003): 139–162.  
 
———. “Toward a ‘Multipolar World’: Using Oil Diplomacy to Sever Venezuela’s 
Dependence.” NACLA Report on the Americas, (Sep–Oct 2007), 15–43.  
 
Ellner, S. and D. Hellinger. Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era: Class, Polarization, 
and Conflict. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 
 
Ellsworth, B. "Venezuela Copes with Crumbling Infrastructure." NPR (online), 19 
January 2006. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5162934 
(accessed 19 March 2009).  
 104
———. “Chavez Says Colombia and U.S. Plotting Invasion.” International Herald 
Tribune (online), 26 January 2008.  http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/026 
January america/OUKWD–UK–VENEZUELA–COLOMBIA.php (accessed 19 
November 2008). 
 
Erikson, D. P. "Obama & Latin America: Magic or Realism?" World Policy Journal 25, 
no. 4 (2009): 101–107.  
 
Evans, P. "Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?" Politics & Society 36, no. 2 (2008): 
271.  
 
“Falling Oil Prices Sap Power of Anti–U.S. Regimes." The Heat Zone (Online), 21 
October 2008. http://heatusa.com/blog/uncategorized/falling–oil–prices–sap–
power–antius–regimes/ (accessed 12 February 2009).  
 
Faulconbridge, G. "Venezuela's Chavez Seeks Arms Deals in Russia." International 
Herald Tribune (online), 21 July 2008.  
http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/07/21/america/OUKWD–UK–
VENEZUELA–CHAVEZ–RUSSIA.php (accessed 17 January 2009). 
 
Feifer, G. "Russia: Putin Says Russia should Become 'Great Power'." Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 May 2003.  
http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1103255.html (accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Feng, Z. "The Russia–Georgia Military Conflict: For China, does it Mean Scrambling 
between a “Strategic Partnership” and being a “responsible Stakeholder”?" 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 20, no. 4 (2008): 305–318.  
 
Figueiredo, J. "U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America: Time for a Change." Orbis 51, no. 
4 (2007): 697–709.  
 
Finnemore, M. National Interests in International Society. Cornell University Press, 
1996. 
 
Fletcher, P. “Kerry Attacks Venezuela's Chavez.” Global Exchange (online), 22 March 
2004.  http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/venezuela/1683.html 
(accessed 16 December 2008). 
 
Foek, A. "Venezuela Worries Aruba." The Washington Times, 13 January 2009. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/13/venezuela–worries–aruba/ 





“Foreign Minister Maduro: Accords Signed between Russia and Venezuela Strengthen a 
Multipolar World." Consulate General of Venezuela, Chicago, United States, 6 
November 2008.  http://embavenez–
us.org/_chicago/index.php?pagina=news.php&nid=4639 (accessed 20 March 
2009).  
 
Forero, J. “FARC Computer Files are Authentic, Interpol Probe Finds.” The Washington 
Post (online), 15 May 2008.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp–
dyn/content/article/2008/05/15/AR2008051504153.html (accessed 12 December 
2008). 
 
Frank, André Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1967.  
 
Freddoso, D. "Obama's Only Executive Experience, NRO: Forget about Bill Ayers. Lets 
Talk about Obama's Executive Role in the Education Project Ayers Founded." 
cbsnews.com from National Review (online), 10 October 2008. 
 
Frederick, J. C. The History of Venezuela. Greenwood Press, 2005.  
 
Friedman, T. "The First Law of Petropolitics." Ecologist–London and Wadebridge then 
Slinfold then London 36, no. 6 (2006): 24. 
 
Fulgham, Q. "Venezuela's Potential Threat to the United States' National Security: An 
Analysis of the Conflictual Inter–Country Relationship." Master's thesis, Army 
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, (2006).  
 
Gabuev, A. and A. Gritskova. "Hugo Chávez Undergoes Conversion//Russia Changes its 
Priorities in Relations with Venezuela." Kommersant Moscow (online), 22 July 
2008. http://www.kommersant.com/p914653/r_527/Russian–
Venezuelan_relations_/ (accessed 16 March 2009).  
 
Gaddy, C. G. and B. W. Ickes. "Russia's Virtual Economy." Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 
(1998): 53–67. 
 
Galeano, E. Open Veins of Latin America. Monthly Review Press New York, 1997.  
 
“Gazprom to Become Russia–Venezuela Energy Consortium Operator." RIA Novosti 
(Russian News and Information Agency), 22 October 2008.  
http://en.rian.ru/business/20081022/117892646.html (accessed 20 March 2009).  
 
Gelman, V. "Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species?" Post–Soviet Affairs 21, 
no. 3 (2005): 226–246.  
 
 106
Goldman, M. I. "The Dog Barks but the Caravan Moves on." Demokratizatsiya: The 
Journal of Post–Soviet Democratization 15, no. 4 (2007): 360–370.  
 
———. "Putin, the Oligarchs & the End of Political Liberalization." The Economists' 
Voice 2, no. 2 (2005): 1.  
 
Gott, R. Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. Verso, 2005.  
 
Gue, E. "Crude Oil Production Means Investment—Iran and Venezuela are Failing to 
Invest." The Market Oracle (online), 8 February 2008.  
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article324.html (accessed 19 March 2009).  
 
Gunson, P. "Chavez's Venezuela." Current History–New York then Philadelphia 105, no. 
688 (2006): 58. 
 
Gutterman, S. "Russia: Putin and Chávez Plug 'Multi–Polar World'." Nachrichten English 
News (online), 26 September 2008.  http://www.welt.de/english–
news/article2495684/Putin–and–Chavez–plug–multi–polar–world.html (accessed 
18 February 2009).  
 
Haass, R. N. “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance?” Foreign 
Affairs 87, no.3 (2008).  
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard–n–haass/the–age–
of–nonpolarity.html (accessed 10 October 2008). 
 
Hakim, P. “Is Washington Losing Latin America?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 
2006): 39–53.  http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060101faessay85105/peter–
hakim/is–washington–losing–latin–america.htmlmode%3Dprint (accessed 3 
February 2008). 
 
Halpin, T. “President Dmitri Medvedev Orders Missiles Deployed in Europe as World 
Hails Obama.” The Times (online), 6 November 2008. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5090077.ece 
(accessed 17 November 2008). 
 
Hammond, J. “Latin America: A Resurgent Left?” New Politics 11, no. 4 (2008): 40. 
 
Hancock, K. J. "Russia: Great Power Image versus Economic Reality." Asian Perspective 
31, no. 4 (2007): 71–98. 
 
Hart, G. and G. Humphrey. "Creating a Cold Peace by Expanding NATO." Occupational 
Hazards (20 March 1998).  
 
 107
Herrera, G. A. "Petróleo y Gas En América Latina. Un Análisis Político y De Relaciones 
Internacionales a Partir De La Política Venezolana." Documento De Trabajo (DT) 
19, no. 9 (2006). 
 
Holbrooke, R. "The End of the Romance." The Washington Post, sec. A19, 16 February 
2005.  
 
Holland, S. "Bush Avoids Direct Battle with Venezuela's Chávez," swissinfo.ch (online), 
05 November 2005. 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/index.html?siteSect=143&sid=6217239&cKey=113
1233723000 (accessed 25 May 2009). 
 
Hults, D. "Petroleos De Venezuela, SA: The Right–Hand Man of the Government." 
Working paper # 70, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at the 
Center for Environmental Science and Policy, Stanford University, Stanford , CA,  
(November 2007).  
 
Husain, S. "Venezuela Advocating ‘Fair Price’ for Oil." Pakistan Dawn, 6 August 2006. 
http://www.dawn.com/2006/08/06/ebr3.htm (accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
Isachenkov, I. "Russia and Venezuela Cooperate on Military Exercise, Mounting 
Tensions with the U.S." huffingtonpost.com (online), 9 September 2009.  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/08/russia–and–venezuela–
coop_n_124764.html (accessed 22 February 2009).  
 
Ivanov, I. S. The New Russian Diplomacy. Brookings Institution Press, 2002.  
 
Jackson, R. H. and G. Sorensen. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and 
Approaches. Oxford University Press, U.S.A., 2007.  
 
Jaffe, A. and R. Manning. “Russia, Energy and the West.” Survival 43, no. 2 (2001): 
133–152. 
 
Jaffe, A., R. Soligo, and P. E. Center. “The International Oil Companies.” James A. 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University Working Papers, 2007. 
 
Jervis, R. “The Remaking of a Unipolar World.” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3 
(2006): 5–19. 
 
Jobst, S. "The Venezuelan–Russian Alliance and American Superpower: Emergence of a 
Multipolar World?"salem–news.com (online), 24 February 2009.  
http://www.salem–news.com/articles/february242009/ruso_venez_2–24–09.php 
(accessed 16 March 2009).  
 
 108
Johnson, S., A. Cohen, and W. L. T. Schirano. “Countering Hugo Chávez's Anti–U.S. 
Arms Alliance.” Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, (2006). 
 
Johnson, S., B. Lieberman, D. Markheim, A. Cohen, R. D. Utt, B. M. Riedl, J. J. 
Carafano, M. M. Eaglen, B. Spring, and A. A. Fraser. "What a Chávez Win 
Means in Venezuela and for U.S. Policy." Constitution 1284, (2006).  
 
Kagan, R. "The September 12 Paradigm." Foreign Affairs (September/October 2008).  
 
Kagarlitsky, B. Upravlyaemaya Demokratia: Rossia Kotoruyu Nam Navyazali. Ultra 
Kultura, 2005.  
 
Kahler, M. "Rationality in International Relations." International Organization 52, no. 04 
(2005): 919–941.  
 
Karle, W. "Realism and Liberalism Continue to Shape the Ways in which Policy Makers 
Conceptualise International Relations." Shedden Papers 2009, no. 2/28/2009 
(2003): 1–9 (accessed 28 February 2009).  
 
Katz, M. N. "The Putin–Chavez Partnership." Problems of Post–Communism 53, no. 4 
(2006): 3–9. 
 
Keenan, E. L. "Muscovite Political Folkways." Russian Review (1986): 115–181.  
 
Kellerhalls, Jr, M. "Russian Overtures to Venezuela not a Threat, U.S. Official Says." 
america.gov (online), 20 October 2008.  http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec–
english/2008/October/20081020150354dmslahrellek0.3442041.html (accessed 26 
January 2009).  
 
Kendall, B. "Insight: The New Order?" BBC News (Online), 9 February 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7879202.stm (accessed 9 February 2009).  
 
Kennedy, A. “Venezuela’s Chávez to Broadcast His Show Five Nights a Week.” 
bloomberg.com (online), 13 February 2007. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aao3B_h_p0Sk&refe
r=latin_america (accessed 1 November 2008). 
 
Kennedy, S. "Russia Greets Obama with First Foreign Policy Test." ABC News 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation), 6 November 2008.  
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/11/06/2412692.htm (accessed 11 
December 2008). 
 
Keohane, R. O. "Ideas Part–Way Down." Review of International Studies 26, no. 01 
(2000): 125–130.  
 
 109
———. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond." Neorealism and its 
Critics. Columbia University Press, 1986.  
 
Keohane, R. O. and J. S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. 
 
——— and R. Owen. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
 
Kim, L. "Russia Lays out Nuclear Arms Position After ‘Reset’ with U.S." 
bloomberg.com (online), 7 March 2009.  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aq2nG_1h6IFo&refe
r=us (accessed 19 March 2009).  
 
Kozloff, N. Hugo Chávez: Oil, Politics, and the Challenge to the U.S. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007.  
 





(accessed 20 April 2009).  
 
Kramnik, I. "Russia, Venezuela Leaders Vow Closer Ties Ahead of Navy Exercise." RIA 
Novosti (Russian News and Information Agency), 26 November 2008. 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russia_Venezuela_leaders_vow_closer_ties_ah
ead_of_navy_exercise_999.html (accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
Krastev, I. "Democracy's "Doubles"." Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 52.  
 
Kraul, C. "U.S. Officially Bans Arms Sales to Venezuela." LA Times, 16 May 2006. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/16/world/fg–venezuela16 (accessed 16 
January 2009). 
 
Kraul, C. and P. McDonnell. "Russia Seeking Inroads among Latin American Nations." 
LA Times, 27 November 2008.  
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/europe/la–fg–medvedev27–
2008nov27,0,4472657.story (accessed 11 December 2008). 
 
Kubbig, B. "America: Escaping the Legacy of the ABM Treaty." Contemporary Security 
Policy 26, no. 3 (2005): 410–430. 
 
Kubicek, P. "Russian Foreign Policy and the West." Political Science Quarterly 111, no. 
4 (Winter 1999–2000): 547–568.  
 110
Lander, E. "Venezuelan Social Conflict in a Global Context." Latin American 
Perspectives 32, no. 2 (March 2005).  
 
Lanskoy, M. and G. Areshidze. "Georgia’s Year of Turmoil." Journal of Democracy 19, 
no. 4 (2008).  
 
Lapper, R. “Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chávez's Venezuela.” Council 
on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 20, (2006): 1–56. 
 
Lasseter, T. "Russia Outmaneuvered U.S. Over Air Base, Analysts Say." 
mcclatchydc.com (online), 5 March 2009. 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/117/story/63357.html (accessed 18 March 2009).  
 
Lavrov, S. Interview. “Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Interview with 
RIA Novosti on Russian Relations with the Countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean Basin.” RIA Novosti (Russian News and Information Agency), 17 
November 2008. 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/5bd96b3929
906117c3257504004f8c10?OpenDocument (accessed 20 November 2008). 
 
Leder, F. and J. N. Shapiro. “This Time its Different: An Inevitable Decline in World 
Petroleum Production Will Keep Oil Product Prices High, Causing Military 
Conflicts and Shifting Wealth and Power from Democracies to Authoritarian 
Regimes.” Energy Policy 36, no. 8 (2008): 2840–2842. 
 
Leogrande, W. M. "A Poverty of Imagination: George W. Bush's Policy in Latin 
America." Journal of Latin American Studies 39, no. 02 (2007): 355–385.  
 
Levy, C. "Poker–Faced, Russia Flaunts its Afghan Card." New York Times, 21 February 
2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/weekinreview/22levy.html (accessed 
25 February 2009).  
 
Lewis, P. H. Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Dictators, Despots, and Tyrants. 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.  
 
Liena, F. and L. Jei. "Bumpy Oil Prices Test World's Nerves." chinaview.cn (online), 20 
December 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–
12/20/content_10529881.htm (accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Lieven, A. "Why are We Trying to Reheat the Cold War?" Los Angeles Times, 19 March 
2006. http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/19/opinion/op–lieven19 (accessed 5 





Light , M. "Russia in a Multipolar World: Russian Independent Media on Putin's Visit to 
Iran." World Politics Review, 26 October 2007.  
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=1273 (accessed 2 February 
2009).  
 
———. "Russian–American Relations under George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin." Irish 
Studies in International Affairs 19, no. –1 (2008): 25–32.  
 
Lo, B. "Russia and the Multipolar Myth." Centre for European Reform (online), 4 July 
2008. http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2008/07/russia–and–
multipolar–myth.html (accessed 19 March 2009).  
 
Loven, J. "Bush Begins Trip; Tensions Remain." Rutland Herald (online), 7 May 2005. 
http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050507/NEWS/5050
70392/1024 (accessed 10 February 2009).  
 
Makienko, K. and D. Vassiliev. "Russia on the Arms Market in 2006." Moscow Defense 
Brief 1, no. 7 (2007).  http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2–2007/item3/item1/ (accessed 15 
January 2009). 
 
———. "The Venezuela Contracts." Moscow Defense Brief 1, no. 7 (2007) (accessed 15 
January 2009). 
 
Mankoff, J. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2009.  
 
Manwaring, M. G. “Latin America's New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric 
Conflict and Hugo Chávez.” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
August 2007.  
 
———. “Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare.” 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005.  
 
Maples, M.D. (LT GEN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency). "Current and Projected 
National Security Threats to the United States." Statement for the Record, Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence 11, (27 February 2007).  
 
Marcella, G. "American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment." 
Strategic Studies Institute 1, no. 1 (October, 2007): 1–2–71. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=811 






Markey, P. "Venezuela Signs 1.56 Bln Military Deal with Spain." Malaysia Star 
(Online), 28 November 2005.  
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/11/29/worldupdates/2005–11–
28T234115Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_–225372–1&sec=Worldupdates 
(accessed 5 February 2009).  
 
Marquez, H. “Venezuela–Russia: Business Deals Consolidate Alliance.” Inter Press 
Service News Agency (online), 13 November 2008.  
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44687 (accessed 17 November 2008). 
 
———. "Colombia–Venezuela: Possibly the Bitterest Conflict in a Century." Inter Press 
Service News Agency (online), 26 November 2007.  
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40220 (accessed 17 August 2008).  
 
McCoy, J. and D. J. Myers. The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. 
John’s Hopkins University Press, 2004. 
 
McCoy, J. L. "The 2004 Venezuelan Recall Referendum." Taiwan Journal of Democracy 
2, no. 1 (2006): 61–79.  
 
McDermott, J. "Chávez Tightens His Grip on Power." The Telegraph (online), 16 April 
2008. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/1391139/C
havez–tightens–his–grip–on–power.html (accessed 5 February 2009).  
 
McFaul, M. and K. Stoner–Weiss. "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model." Foreign 
Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 68–84.  
 
McIntyre, J. and L. Ure. "Expert: Russia–Venezuela Military Exercises Reaction to U.S. 
Moves." CNN.com (online), 25 September 2008. 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/25/russia.venezuela/index.html 
(accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Miller–Llana, S. "Russia's New Presence in Latin America." Christian Science Monitor, 
24 November 2008.  http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1125/p01s01–woam.html 
(accessed 11 December 2008).  
 
Milov, V., L. L. Coburn, and I. Danchenko. "Russia's Energy Policy, 1992–2005." 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 47, no. 3 (2006): 285–313.  
 
Mirovalev, M. "Venezuelan President Vows to Broaden Russian Investment." 
International Herald Tribune (online), 28 June 2007.  
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/29/europe/EU–GEN–Russia–Venezuela–
Chavez.php?page=2 (accessed 21 January 2009). 
 113
Moloney, A. “Uribe, Chávez Attempt to Turn the Page on Colombia–Venezuela 
Relations.” World Politics Review (online), 14 July 2008.  
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=2423 (accessed 12 
December 2008). 
 
Monaghan, A. “Russian Responses to the U.S.A. as Hegemon: An Evolving Opposition.” 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 
Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, U.S.A., 
22 March 2006. 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/0/7/9/pages1
00797/p100797–1.php (accessed 17 November 2008). 
 
Morgan, D. "U.S. Urges Ukraine NATO Membership, Action Unlikely." Reuters 
(online), 11 November 2008.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed2/idUSN11530324 (accessed 9 
February 2009).  
 
Morgan, J. "Venezuela's Chávez Sees an Ally –– Russia Sees More Business." Latin 
American Herald Tribune (Online), November 2008. 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=321444&CategoryId=10717 (accessed 
3 December 2008).  
 
Morrison, J. "Embassy Row– Latin Storm." The Washington Times, 16 January 2009. 
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/16/embassy–row–95446917/ 
(accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
Muller, H. "The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World." The 
Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2007): 63–75. 
 
Naim, M. “Missing Links: A Venezuelan Paradox.” Foreign Policy, no. 135 (Mar.—
Apr., 2003): 95–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183609 (accessed 13 October 
2008). 
 
“NATO Woos Russia on Afghanistan." BBC News (online), 5 March 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7925944.stm (accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Nicholson, A. "Russia may Send Strategic Bombers to Cuba, Venezuela." 
bloomberg.com (online), 14 March 2009.  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aOEsM2K7T0i8 
(accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Norden, D. “Civilian Authority without Civilian Dominance? Assessing Venezuelan 
Political–Military Relations Under Chavez.” Nueva Sociedad 213, (2008): 17. 
 
 114
———. “Democracy in Uniform: Chávez and the Venezuelan Armed Forces.” In Steve 
Ellner and Daniel Hellinger, eds., Veneuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, 
Polarization, and Conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (2004), 93–
110. 
 
Nye, J. "Neorealism and Neoliberalism." World Politics 40, no. 2 (1988): 235–251.  
 
“Obama's Outreach to Adversaries Takes Unexpected Turn with Taliban Approach." 
FOXnews.com (online), 9 March 2009.  
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/first100days/2009/03/09/talk–taliban–outreach–
obama–makes–court–press/ (accessed 19 March 2009).  
 
Oleinik, A. "Existing and Potential Constraints Limiting State Servants' Opportunism: 
The Russian Case." Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 24, no. 
1 (2008): 156–189.  
 
“On the Outcomes of the Visit of Chairman of the Russian Government, Mikhail 
Kasyanov, to Latin America." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, 17 December 2001. 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/d8ef6e5a1e399
98c43256b26002d7098?OpenDocument (accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
Osborn, A. "Chávez Bolsters Links with Russia." Wall Street Journal, 27 September 
2008. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122242592738578617.html (accessed 16 
March 2009).  
 
Padgett, T. "Hugo Chavez for President ... Now and Forever?" Time, 2 December 2008. 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1863197,00.html (accessed 26 
January 2009). 
 
Palacio, M. and A. Gabuev. "Colombia–the New Venezuela." Kommersant (online), 27 
May 2008.  http://www.kommersant.com/p896309/arms_sales_Colombia/ 
(accessed 11 December 2008). 
 
Parmar, I. "Catalysing Events, Think Tanks and American Foreign Policy Shifts: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Impacts of Pearl Harbor 1941 and 11 September 
2001." Government and Opposition 40, no. 1 (2005): 1–25.  
 
Pearson, N. "Venezuela Rejects U.S. Official's Remarks." The Washington Post (online), 
31 January 2007.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp–
dyn/content/article/2007/01/31/AR2007013100150.html (accessed 5 February 
2009).  
 
Perkins, D. Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine. Little, Brown and company, 
1941.  
 115
Perry, W. J. “The U.S. Military under Strain and at Risk.” A paper for the National 
Security Advisory Group II, (January 2006): 1–22.  
 
Petersen, F. and F. Freland. "Chávez and Medvedev Vow Continued Cooperation." 
france24.com (online), 27 November 2008.  
http://www.france24.com/en/20081127–chavez–greets–medvedev–with–deals–
controversy–russia–venezuela (accessed 20 March 2009).  
 
Peterson, K. A. "Implications of China's Growing Demand for Oil: A Case Study in 
Venezuela." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, (2007).  
 
Peterson, R. D. “U.S. Strategy to Deal with Hugo Chavez's Establishment of Militias.” 
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Feb 27, 2008, 1–35. 
 
Phillips, D. L. "Russia: Abkhazia is Not Kosovo." Transitions Online, no. 02/12 (12 
February 2008).  
 
Pifer, S. "Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S.–Russian Relations in 2009." Policy 
Paper Number 10, Foreign Policy at Brookings 2009, (January 2009).   
 
Poole, K. T. "Changing Minds? Not in Congress!" Public Choice 131, no. 3 (2007): 435–
451.  
 
Post, J. M. ""El Fenomeno Chávez": Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Modern Day Bolivar."  
Counterproliferation Papers 39, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air 
University, Maxwell AFB, AL, (2007).  
 
Powell, M. J. “The U.S. and Chavez: To Confront Or to Contain.” Naval War College 
Newport, RI, Joint Military Operations Dept, (2006).  
http://www.stormingmedia.us/49/4993/A499364.html (accessed 14 October 
2008). 
 
Prescott, J. "An Examination of Perception and Knowledge Concerning the Venezuelan 
Government under the Leadership of Hugo Chávez." Master's thesis, University 
of Texas at Arlington, August 2007.  
 
Pronina, L. "Arms Producers Take Aim at Wider Clientele." The Moscow Times (online), 
19 December 2001.  http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1–49052002.html 
(accessed 15 January 2009). 
 
——— L. and M. Walter. "Medvedev and Chavez Sign Oil, Nuclear Deals." The 
Moscow Times (online), 28 November 2008.  




Putin, V. "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation." fas.org (online), 28 
June 2000.  http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm (accessed 
9 March 2009).  
 
“Putin, Venezuela's Chavez Plan Anti–U.S. Alliance." newsmax.com (online), 15 May 
2001. http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/5/14/171808.shtml 
(accessed 15 January 2009). 
 
Ramírez, C. V. "Hemos Derrotado El Diablo! Chávez Supporters, Anti–Neoliberalism, 
and Twenty–First Century Socialism." Identities 15, no. 2 (2008): 147–170.  
 
Ratliff, W. “Pragmatism over Ideology: China’s Relations with Venezuela.” China Brief 
for Jamestown Foundation 6, no. 6 (2006): 1–3. 
 
Reading, D. K. The Anglo–Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734. Yale University Press, 
1938.  
 
Reid, M. Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul. Yale University 
Press, 2007.  
 
Retamal, N. "U.S. Leaves Latin America on the Back Burner, says DeShazo." The 
Santiago Times (online), 10 October 2008. 
http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:woBsAoP0tBkJ:www.santiagotimes.cl/sant
iagotimes/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=14837+latin+america
+US+back+burner&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us&client=firefox–a (accessed 9 
February 2009).  
 
Ribando, C. M. and B. Vaughn. "Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 
110th Congress." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006. 
 
Rieber, A. J. "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay." 
Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge 
University Press (1993): 315–322.  
 
Rivero, R. "A Fact of Life: Strategic Alliance for Venezuela and Russia." Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs (online), 23 July 2008.  http://www.coha.org/2008/07/a–
fact–of–life–strategic–alliance–venezuela–and–russia/ (accessed 3 December 
2008).  
 
Roberts, J. M. "If the Real Simón Bolívar Met Hugo Chávez, He'd See Red." Heritage 
Foundation Report, Backgrounder 13, no. 2062 (29 August 2007).  
 
Roberts, K. "Latin America's Populist Revival." SAIS Review 27, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 
2007): 3–15.  
 
 117
Roett, R. “United States–Latin American Relations: The Current State of Play.” Nueva 
Sociedad 206, November–December 2006, 1–14. 
 
Romero, S. "Chávez Backs off Threats to Halt Oil Exports to U.S." New York Times, 18 
February 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/americas/18venez.html (accessed 25 
February 2009).  
 
———. "Chávez Wins Referendum to End Term Limits." International Herald Tribune 
(online), 16 February 2009.  
http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/16/america/venez.php (accessed 18 March 
2009).  
 
———. "Timely Reversals Show Chávez's Political Instincts." International Herald 
Tribune (online), 10 June 2008.  
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/10/america/venez.php (accessed 18 March 
2009).  
 
———. "Venezuela and Russia Sign Accords." New York Times, 27 November 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/28/world/americas/28venez.html?ref=europe 
(accessed 22 January 2009). 
 
———. “Venezuela Announces Early Plans for Military Exercises with Russia in 
Caribbean.” New York Times, 7 September 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/world/americas/08venez.html?partner=rssny
t (accessed 7 November 2008). 
 
Rousseau, D. L. Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction 
of Realism and Liberalism. Stanford University Press, 2006.  
 
Roy, M. S. "The Russian–Georgian Conflict: Growing Uncertainties in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia." Strategic Analysis 33, no. 1 (2009): 13–18.  
 
Ruggie, J. G. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo–Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge." International Organization 52, no. 04 (2005): 855–
885.  
 
“Russia—Lukoil in Venezuela." APS Review Oil Market Trends (online), 11 March 
2007. http://www.allbusiness.com/agriculture–forestry–fishing–hunting/support–
activities/3890065–1.html (accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
“Russia and Venezuela Boost Ties.” BBC News Europe (online), 26 September 2008.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7636989.stm (accessed 3 November 2008). 
 
 118
“Russia and Venezuela Shake Hands." FSU Energy, 10 May 2002. 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286–31064533_ITM 
(accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
“Russia Lends $1bn to Venezuela to Buy Arms." The Times of India, 25 September 2008. 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Russia_lends_Venezuela_1bn_for_arms
/articleshow/3527626.cms (accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
“Russia Says Chávez has Offered Temporary Base for Bombers." Wall Street Journal, 14 
March 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123703849968430221.html 
(accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
“Russia Wants Venezuela Work." The Oil Daily, Energy Intelligence Group, 2 July 2007. 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286–31883782_ITM 
(accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
“Russia, Venezuela to Hold Joint Air Force Drills in 2009.” RIA Novosti (Russian News 
and Information Agency), 31 October 2008.  
http://en.rian.ru/world/20081031/118054642.html (accessed 11 November 2008). 
 
“Russia, Venezuela to Set Up Joint Venture in Oil Industry." ITAR–TASS (online), 13 
March 2009. http://www.itar–
tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13678001&PageNum=0 (accessed 20 March 
2009).  
 
“Russia: Ukraine, Europe and the Natural Gas Cutoff." Stratfor, 4 December 2008. 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081204_russia_ukraine_europe_and_natural_
gas_cutoff?ip_auth_redirect=1 (accessed 12 December 2008). 
 
“Russian Arms Sale to Chávez Irks U.S." The Washington Times, 10 February 2005. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/feb/10/20050210–123420–3113r/ 
(accessed 20 March 2009).  
 
“Russian Firms Sign Cooperation Deals with Venezuelan Oil Giant." RIA Novosti 
(Russian News and Information Agency), 22 July 2008 .  
http://en.rian.ru/business/20080722/114658286.html (accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
“Russian Firms Welcome Venezuela's Debut.” FSU Energy, 18 May 2001. 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286–31041504_ITM 
(accessed 11 November 2008). 
 
“Russian Strategic Bombers Return Home from Venezuela." RIA Novosti (Russian News 
and Information Agency), 19 September 2008.  
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080919/116949143.html (accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
 119
Sanchez, A. “Russia Returns to Latin America.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 14 
February 2007.  http://www.coha.org/2007/02/russia–returns–to–latin–america/ 
(accessed 16 December 2008). 
 
———. “Memorandum to the Press: Venezuela’s Security Factors and Foreign Policy 
Goals.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2 May 2007.  
http://www.coha.org/2007/05/memorandum–to–the–press–venezuelas–security–
factors–and–policy–goals/ (accessed 16 December 2008). 
 
———. “Venezuela’s Military in the Hugo Chávez Era.” Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs, 18 September 2008.  http://www.coha.org/2008/09/venezuelaâ™s–
military–in–the–hugo–chavez–era/ (accessed 16 December 2008). 
 
Sanchez, F. "Venezuela Criticizes U.S. for Blocking Sale of Spanish Planes with U.S. 
Parts." AP Worldstream (online), 14 January 2006.  
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286–12346614_ITM 
(accessed 16 March 2009).  
 
———. "Venezuela Steps Up Arms Spending." Seattle Times, 31 May 2006. 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20060531&slug=ven
ezuela31 (accessed 15 January 2009). 
 
Sanders, R. “Venezuela in the Caribbean: Expanding its Sphere of Influence.” The Round 
Table 96, no. 391 (2007): 465–476. 
 
Saralayeva, L. "Kyrgyz Vote on U.S. Base Held Up by Russian Aid." Associated Press 
International (online), 9 February 2009.  
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5goSq–
Hk4_xi9Fm7sI4SLjpc5neiwD9687NC07 (accessed 9 February 2009).  
 
Schmollinger, C. and G. Smith, “Crude Oil Futures Drop after U.S. Senate Rejects Auto 
Bailout.” bloomberg.com (online), 12 December 2008.  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601091&sid=aWtLCDffqFYY&re
fer=india (accessed 12 December 2008).  
 
Schoen, D. and M. Rowan. The Threat Closer to Home: Hugo Chávez and the War 
against America. Free Press, 2009.  
 
Schwirtz, M. "Russia Loans Venezuela $1 Billion for Military." New York Times, 26 
September 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/americas/27chavez.html?fta=y 
(accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
 120
Schwirtz, M. and E. Barry. "Russian President Welcomes Shift by U.S." New York Times, 
20 March 2009.  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/021 March 
world/europe/21russia.html?ref=world (accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
Shakleyina, T. A. and A. D. Bogaturov. "The Russian Realist School of International 
Relations." Communist and Post–Communist Studies 37, no. 1 (2004): 37–51.  
 
Shapiro, I. "To Russia with Love: A Plea for Normalcy." World Policy Journal 25, no. 4 
(2009): 63–73.  
 
Shchedrov, O. and C. Baldwin. “Russia Trumpets Venezuela Ties.” Reuters (online), 23 
July 2008.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/OILPRD/idUSL2210042820080723?pageNumber
=2&virtualBrandChannel=0 (accessed 16 November 2008). 
 
Shevtsova, L. "Imitation Russia." The American Interest (November/December 2006): 1–
2.  
 
Shifter, M. "In Search of Hugo Chavez." Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006): 45–59. 
 
———. “Slouching Toward Authoritarianism.” Foreign Affairs, 7 November 2007.  
 
Shvetsova, O. "Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 
and 2000." Slavic Review 64, no. 1 (2005): 205–206.  
 
Simes, D. K. "Losing Russia." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (2007): 36.  
 
Simha, R. "Might of the White Swan—Game Changer." Inida Empire (online), 10 
September 2008. 
http://www.indiaempire.com/v1/2008/November/international.asp (accessed 26 
January 2009). 
 
Skorlygina, N. and D. Rebrov. "Russia Leads the Way Back." Kommersant—Russia's 
Daily (online), 19 September 2007.  
http://www.kommersant.com/p805982/r_1/foreign_trade_investment/ (accessed 
21 January 2009). 
 
Smith, K. C. “Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe.” CSIS Euro–Focus 13, no. 
1 (2007): 1–8. 
 
Sojo, C. "Venezuela's Chávez Accuses U.S. Government of Considering His 
Assassination." venezuelanalysis.com (online), 25 February 2005.  
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/951 (accessed 18 March 2009).  
 
 121
“Spain Defies U.S., Seals Arms Deal with Venezuela." Pakistan Dawn, 30 November 
2005. http://www.dawn.com/2005/11/30/int8.htm (accessed 16 January 2009). 
 
“Spain–Venezuela Arms Deal Nears." BBC News (online), 26 November 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4472342.stm (accessed 20 April 2009). 
 
“The Spluttering Axis of Diesel—an Axis in Need of Oiling." The Economist, 23 October 
2008. 
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12480
942 (accessed 12 February 2009).  
 
Stakelbeck, Jr, S. "Hugo Chavez's Threat to U.S. Security and Regional Stability." 
globalpolitician.com (online), 20 February 2005.  
http://www.globalpolitician.com/2350–chavez–venezuela (accessed 12 December 
2008). 
 
Stocker, J. "Nuclear Non–Proliferation." Adelphi Papers 46, no. 386 (2006): 61–68.  
 
Sullivan, M. P. "Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy." Congressional 
Research Service, 11 January 2008.  http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:Tu–
BT1qCQ4cJ:fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf+"venezuela:political+conditions+a
nd+US+policy"&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (accessed 10 March 2009).  
 
Tkachenko, M., M. Chance, and C. Keyes. "Russian Ships to Visit Venezuela; Naval 
Exercises Possible." CNN.com (online), 9 September 2008. 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/09/08/russia.venezuela/index.html 
(accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
Tompson, W. "A Frozen Venezuela? The 'Resource Curse' and Russian Politics." Chap. 
in Robert Ellam ed., Russia’s Oil and Natural Gas, Bonanza or Curse? 1–21, 
London: Anthem Press, 2006.  
 
———. "The Political Implications of Russia's Resource–Based Economy." Post–Soviet 
Affairs 21, no. 4 (2005): 335–359.  
 
Towson, M. "100,000 AK–103 Russian Assault Rifles for Venezuela." Report for U.S. 
House of Representatives, 25 July 2005.  
http://www.house.gov/list/press/il10_kirk/venezuelarifles.html (accessed 25 
January 2009). 
 
Treisman, D. "Is Russia's Experiment with Democracy Over?" UCLA International 
Institute (online), 29 October 2004.  
http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=16294 (accessed 5 
February 2009).  
 
 122
Trenin, D. “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West.” The Washington 
Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2007): 95–106. 
 
———. "Russia Leaves the West." Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (2006): 87–96.  
 
Trinkunas, H. A. Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative 
Perspective. The University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 
 
———. “Defining Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution.” Military Review 85, no. 4 
(2005): 39. 
 
———. "The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil–Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth 
Republic." Latin American Research Review 37, no. 1 (2002): 41–76.  
 
———. "The Logic of Venezuelan Foreign Policy during the Chávez Era." Paper 
prepared for the 50th Conference of the International Studies Association, New 
York, 14–17 February 2009, 2008.  
 
———. "What is Really New about Venezuela’s Bolivarian Foreign Policy?" Strategic 
Insights V, no. 2 (February 2006).  
 
“U.S. Must Agree with Russia on Afghanistan Supplies." RIA Novosti (Russian News 
and Information Agency), 6 February 2009.  
http://en.rian.ru/world/20090206/120013388.html (accessed 21 March 2009).  
 
“U.S. Skeptical of Arms Deal with Russians." The Washington Times, 23 May 2005.   
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/may/23/20050523–103116–5028r/ 
(accessed 15 January 2009). 
 
“U.S., Latin America: The President Tours a Divided Region." Stratfor: Global 
Intelligence, 7 March 2007.  
http://www.stratfor.com/u_s_latin_america_president_tours_divided_region 
(accessed 19 February 2009).  
 
Ulam, A. "Soviet Diplomacy: Bluffing." New York Times, 28 June 1981. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E0D91138F93BA15755C0
A967948260 (accessed 19 March 2009).  
 
“U.S. Diplomat in Moscow to Discuss Latin America." International Herald Tribune 
(online), 22 December 2008.  
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/22/europe/EU–Russia–US–Latin–
America.php (accessed 10 February 2009).  
 
 123
“U.S. Makes Light of Russian Bomber Parade." presstv.com (online), 16 March 2009. 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=88820&sectionid=3510203 (accessed 21 
March 2009).  
 
“U.S. Military Supplies Allowed through Russia." The Moscow Times (online), 8 
February 2009. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/374358.htm 
(accessed 9 February 2009).  
 
“U.S. Unconcerned Over Russian Naval Maneuvers." International Herald Tribune 
(online), 16 December 2008.  
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/16/america/NA–US–Russian–
Warships.php?page=1 (accessed 5 February 2009).  
 
“U.S.A. Loses Air Base in Kyrgyzstan to Russia." pravda.ru (online), 4 February 2009. 
http://english.pravda.ru/world/ussr/04–02–2009/107058–usa_kyrgyzstan_russia–0 
(accessed 18 March 2009).  
 
Valenzuela, A. "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted." Journal of Democracy 15, 
(2004): 5–19. 
 
“Venezuela Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis—Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal." Energy 
Information Administration, U.S. Government, January 2009.  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Venezuela/Oil.html (accessed 25 February 2009).  
 
“Venezuela Reaffirms Future Arms Purchases from Russia.” RIA Novosti (Russian News 
and Information Agency), 7 November 2008.  
http://en.rian.ru/world/20081107/118181084.html (accessed 11 December 2008). 
 
“Venezuela Rebuffs U.S. on Arms Deals." The Washington Post, sec. A15, The 
Washington Post Company, 12 February 2005.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp–dyn/A17495–
2005Feb11?language=printer (accessed 5 February 2009).  
 
“Venezuela to Buy Russian Submarines, Air Defense Systems." RIA Novosti (Russian 
News and Information Agency), 18 June 2007.  
http://en.rian.ru/world/20070618/67363794.html (accessed 16 January 2009). 
 
“Venezuela to Sign Energy Agreement with Russia." APS Review Oil Market Trends, 22 
November 2004.  http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1–125078795.html (accessed 
21 January 2009). 
 





“Venezuela, Russia Discuss 46 Cooperation Projects." People's Daily—Xinhua (online), 
07 November 2008.  
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90852/6529432.html (accessed 25 
January 2009). 
 
“Venezuela, Russia Expected to Sign Energy Deal." Tehran Times, 25 November 2008. 
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=183283 (accessed 25 January 
2009). 
 
“Venezuela, Russia Sign Agreement to Strengthen Relations." People's Daily—Xinhua 
(online), 12 November 2005.  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200511/12/eng20051112_220740.html 
(accessed 21 January 2009). 
 
“Venezuela: Arms Deals, Big and Small." Stratfor, 6 April 2005. 
http://www.stratfor.com/venezuela_arms_deals_big_and_small?ip_auth_redirect=
1 (accessed 15 January 2009). 
 
“Venezuela's Chavez Hails 'Strategic' Relations with Russia.” RIA Novosti (Russian 
News and Information Agency), 11 May 2008.  
http://en.rian.ru/world/20081105/118129049.html (accessed 16 November 2008). 
 
Verrastro, F. and S. Ladislaw. "Providing Energy Security in an Interdependent World." 
The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2007): 95–104. 
 
Wallander, C. A. "Russian Transimperialism and its Implications." The Washington 
Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2007): 107–122.  
 
Walser, R. "Chávez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis?" Heritage 
Foundation Report, 15 September 2008. 
http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:8ZdvEmc6coAJ:www.heritage.org/researc
h/latinamerica/upload/wm_2064.pdf+ChÃ¡vez,+Venezuela,+and+Russia:+A+Ne
w+Cuban+Missile+Crisis?&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (accessed 26 January 
2009). 
 
Walter, M. and S. Bodzin. "Venezuela Courts Russian Investment as Oil Tumbles." 
Blooomberg.com (online), 6 November 2008. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=LK
OH:RU&sid=ahgcaFEal.B4 (accessed 20 March 2009).  
 
——— and L. Pronina. "Medevedev, Chavez Sign Oil Agreements before War Games." 
bloomberg.com (online), 27 November 2008.  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601207&sid=apvq89J6utOc 
(accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
 125
Waltz, K. N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." International Security 25, no. 1 
(2000): 5–41.  
 
———. Theory of International Politics. McGraw–Hill, 1979.  
 
Waters, M. A. The First and Second Declarations of Havana: Manifestos of 
Revolutionary Struggle in the Americas Adopted by the Cuban People. Pathfinder 
Press, 2007.  
 
Weisbrot, M. and L. Sandoval. “Update: The Venezuela Economy in the Chávez Years.” 
Report for Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), February 2008. 
 
Wendt, A. "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics." Theory and Structure in International Political Economy: An 
International Organization Reader 46, no. 2 (1999): 391–425.  
 
———. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
 
Weyland, K. “Will Chavez Lose His Luster?” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6 (2001): 73–87. 
 
“What the Russian Papers Say." RIA Novosti (Russian News and Information Agency), 
26 September 2008.  http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080926/117153227.html 
(accessed 16 March 2009).  
 
Whitmore, B. "Washington, Moscow Edge toward New Relationship." Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 February 2009. 
http://www.rferl.org/Content/Washington_Moscow_Edge_Toward_New_Relatio
nship/1491916.html (accessed 22 February 2009).  
 
Wilson, C. E. "The Bolivarian Revolution According to Hugo Chávez." Orbis 52, no. 3 
(2008): 523–537.  
 
Wilson, S. "Chavez's Unfinished Revolution; Venezuelan's Accomplishments Fall Short 
of His Rhetoric." The Washington Post, 21 May 2001.  
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2–451606.html (accessed 26 January 2009). 
 
Yanes, H. “The Cuba–Venezuela Alliance: ‘Emancipatory Neo–Bolivarismo’ or 
Totalitarian Expansion?” Institute for Cuban & Cuban–American Studies 
(ICCAS) Occasional Paper Series, University of Miami, (2005). 
 
Yevgeneva, T. "The Myth of the “West” in Russian Political Culture and its Impact on 
Foreign and Security Policy." Studies in Contemporary History and Security 
Policy 1, (1999): 59–70.  
 
 126
Zhuplev, A. "Economic Internationalization of Russia: Roots, Trends, and Scenarios." 
International Political Science Review/ Revue Internationale De Science Politique 
29, no. 1 (2008): 99.  
 
Zuquete, J. P. "The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chávez." Latin American Politics and 
Society 50, no. 1 (2008): 91–121.  
 
Zygar, M., A. Gabuev, N. Skorlygina, and S. Farizova. "Hugo Chávez’ Rating Soared a 
Billion." Kommersant Moscow (online), 27 September 2008. 
http://www.kommersant.com/p1032593/Russia_and_Venezuela_negotiating_big_
deals/ (accessed 25 January 2009).   
 
 127
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Jeanne Giraldo 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Mikhail Tsypkin 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Ralph Porch 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
 
